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Abstract
This thesis reviews policies and technologies for computerized patient record
security. The concept of a federation is presented as a model for automating medical
records. Based upon this model, redisclosure, over-disclosure, inference and aggregation
are identified as specific threats to the confidentiality of the computerized patient record
(CPR) that arise from sharing data across a federation. From the threats, a set of security
objectives emerges. Existing, proposed and pending legislation and guidelines that
address the objectives are surveyed; traditional access control policies are reviewed.
This thesis concludes that the protection afforded by existing, proposed and
pending efforts is incomplete. Each policy merely adds another layer to the inconsistent
patchwork of regulations and tenets that already exists to support confidentiality.
Traditional access control measures are also not well suited to the characteristics of
patient records in a federated environment. Traditional measures assume the existence of
a central authority for administering security and are either too permissive or too
inflexible.
Role-based access control is introduced as a better alternative for supporting
disclosure and inference related threats to the confidentiality of the computerized patient
record. The recommendations are intentionally phrased to facilitate role-based access
controls as a logical mechanism to support policy implementation.
Elements of a security policy that rely upon role-based access control to address
patient record confidentiality are presented as a series of recommendations. Separate
recommendations are drafted for the Federal government, the states and individual
institutions such as hospitals, payers and social services agencies which wish to share the
data in the computerized patient record.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lee W. McKnight
Title: Lecturer,
Technology and Policy Program
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Introduction
In the movie The Fugitive (© 1993. Warner Bros.), Dr. Richard Kimball, falsely
convicted of murdering his wife, begins his search for the elusive one-armed man by
posing as a custodian in Chicago's Cook County Hospital. While cleaning after-hours in
the Department of Prosthetics, Dr. Kimball logs into the patient database and uses the
physical characteristics of the prosthetic to trace the one-armed man's identity and
whereabouts. Were the current Administration's vision of a National Information
Infrastructure in place today, Dr. Kimball might have been able to access the same patient
information without ever having entered the hospital.
For the health care system, a computerized patient record (CPR) that enables the
electronic storage and retrieval of patient information, whether at home or in a medical
center, offers tremendous promise for both decreasing the cost and increasing the quality
of care. A recent study by Arthur D. Little estimates health care cost savings from
electronic record keeping and electronic claims submissions may reach nearly $40 billion
per year. [ADL92] Simultaneously, quality of care should improve due, at least in part,
to increased availability of records and outcomes-based research using cross-matching of
longitudinal patient records. [IOM91 ]
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Even as information technologies promise to streamline the delivery of health
care, however, they introduce new threats to the security of sensitive, confidential
information about individuals contained in the medical record. While the audience may
sympathize with Dr. Kimball and applaud his cleverness in using the hospital information
system to trace the one-armed man, the movie also illustrates one of the vulnerabilities of
electronic record-keeping. An unidentified individual, with no legitimate affiliation to
the Cook County Hospital medical staff, accessed patient files and executed complex
search and cross-matching queries to reveal potentially confidential, sensitive
information. Sound like fiction? In 1987, on the trail of an international, computer
espionage ring, Clifford Stoll tracked West German computer hackers into the Positron-
Emission Tomography (PET) control computer at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories. The
computer is used to calculate radiation doses infused into patients as part of the PET
imaging process. [ST089] It is frightening to think of what a malicious intruder might
have been able to accomplish.
Whether or not computerized patient records (CPRs) are an effective means for
addressing the nation's health care ills is beyond the scope of this thesis. This thesis
explores technologies and policies to minimize threats introduced by the use of computer
and communications technologies to the security of sensitive information contained in the
medical record. The thesis assumes that the CPR is implemented as a federation. One
possible solution is proposed to the vulnerabilities posed by utilizing a federated
electronic infrastructure to share sensitive information between one or more of the
institutional players in the health care community. For this thesis, sensitive information
is defined as any data which directly or, within reason, could indirectly identify a specific
individual. The health care community is defined here to include patients, providers,
payers, employers and supporting organizations.
I The issue of whether or not computerized patient records are an effective means for addressing the nation's health care
ills is beyond the scope of this thesis. For information on recent legislation to mandate the use of computerized patient
records, see BR093 and IOM92.
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Chapter 1 introduces a framework for discussing information security. Some of
these security concerns are a reality of the electronic environment and exist regardless of
what type of data is stored. Other vulnerabilities are inherent to medical recordkeeping.
Vulnerabilities inherent to medical recordkeeping may be unaffected, mitigated, or
exacerbated by the shift from paper to electronic media.
Chapter 2 presents the problem being addressed by asking, "What are the
vulnerabilities?" The chapter begins by describing a federation; this thesis assumes that
the CPR is implemented as a federation. Threats to and vulnerabilities of computer
patient records that arise when institutions share potentially sensitive, confidential
information in a federated environment are identified as security objectives to be
satisfied. 2
Chapter 3 considers the elements a policy should contain in order to address the
concerns raised in Chapter 2. Proposed, pending and existing legislation at the
institutional, state and federal levels are compared and contrasted.
Chapter 4 introduces rote-based access control as a potential technology for
supporting a security policy to meet the objectives from Chapter 2. The chapter begins
by examining traditional discretionary and mandatory access control. Role-based access
control is then presented as an alternative better suited to the patient record environment.
Chapter 5 combines the policies from Chapter 3 and the technologies from
Chapter 4 into a series of recommendations for action by the Federal government, the
states and individual institutions.
2 The threats posed by sharing information in electronic rather than paper-based formats are distinct from the task of
transferring electronic bits between institutions. Analysis of technical approaches for reliable. secure communication,
while also a highly relevant subject for investigation, is beyond the scope of this thesis. As a starting point for finding
more information on this subject, see OTA87, NRC91 and FOR94.
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Chapter One
Information Security
This chapter introduces a framework for assessing information security for
computerized patient records. After reviewing the issues encompassed by information
security studies, the chapter constructs the framework and identifies how this thesis fits
within the framework.
The notion of keeping secret information hidden away from prying eyes is not
new.3 [KAH67] Whether for reasons of national security or for personal privacy,
information security stems from the desire to safeguard information. However,
information security encompasses more than just keeping secrets. The evolution of both
the types of information that society seeks to secure and the technologies by which that
information is shared and stored has expanded the scope of information security studies.
Today, the field of information security studies focuses on three fundamental issues:
what are the objectives of information security, how is information security achieved, and
how is the security of information verified?
Before addressing objectives, mechanisms and verification, however, it may be
useful to begin by clarifying what information security is not. Although it has adapted to
changes over time, the concept of information security should not be thought of as
31n The Codebreakers, David Kahn dates the first use of cryptograhically encoded information to the Third Century
B.C.
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relevant to only a single type of information or a single technology. In the past, the
Department of Defense (DOD) has been the primary sponsor of and motivator for
information security research. Subsequently, a common misconception equated
information security with the Department of Defense's activities to uphold national
security. As a result, the financial community thought that their needs, such as securing a
financial transaction, had little to gain from DOD sponsored research. [CLA93] In fact,
whether the motivation is investment banking or defense maneuvers, many of the
underlying information security policies and procedures are the same.
Likewise, society is becoming increasingly dependent on "electronic ways to
gather, store, manipulate, retrieve, transmit and use information." [OTA87:13]
Consequently, the tendency is to associate information security with the security of a
computer system. However, as discussed below, many of the concerns regarding the
security of information are not at all unique to the electronic environment. Even within
an information system, "security is only partly a technical problem: it has significant
procedural, administrative, physical facility and personnel components as well."
[NRC91:17] There is a danger that those new to the field of information security will
lose sight of the forest, focusing only on a particular technology applied to a particular
domain.
1.1 W hat are the objectives
Information security can be defined in terms of an institution's need for some
combination of confidentiality, integrity and availability. [NRC91] Confidentiality
involves controls on the disclosure of information. It is a security property that prevents
either the existence or the content of information from being known by some population.
[ECM88] One of the better known confidentiality policies is the DOD's hierarchical
information classification scheme. An individual has a security clearance and
information has a security classification that ranges from top-secret to unclassified.
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Security clearance represents a formal authorization to access information that falls
within a specified set of classifications. [DOD85]
Integrity refers to the quality of information and ensures that "[information] is
changed only in a specified and authorized manner." [NRC91:293] As an example,
integrity ensures that information received accurately reflects that which was sent. The
accounting practice that does not permit erasure of an entry to correct an error supports
integrity constraints. Instead, accountants must make a corrective entry on a new line.
[CLA87].
Availability, the third information security parameter, ensures that information is
usable within a given time frame. [NRC91 ] Availability has two elements. First,
information must be accessible to an authorized user. Second, the information, once
retrieved, must be in an interpretable format. Within the patient-physician relationship,
availability means first, that the record is readily available to all health care personnel
with a need to know in order to administer care. Second, that record should be in a
standard format and use terminology familiar to the medical profession. A simple
availability policy is to keep multiple copies of a valuable record and to store one copy in
a physically secure place. [BRS94]
Although confidentiality, integrity and availability do not trade off against one
another, neither are they completely unrelated. The differences in information security
needs between a given pair of institutions are reflected in the balance of the three
information security parameters. For example, both the financial industry and the defense
community are concerned about integrity and the unauthorized disclosure of information.
However, the financial industry places a higher premium on the need for information
integrity relative to confidentiality than does the defense community. [CLA87] Ensuring
that debits and credits are tallied in proper sequence is crucial in the business
environment. Conversely, in the military, ensuring that information is not revealed to
unauthorized personnel is critical.
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1.2 How is information security achieved
The means for fulfilling information security objectives may be divided into
physical, procedural and automated measures. [ECM88; NCS92] As noted earlier,
concern for the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information existed long
before the development of computer technologies. [OTA87] Likewise, although
automated information security controls are a new development, many of the physical
and procedural measures for achieving information security are unchanged by the
migration to electronic media.
Physical measures refer to the environment in which the information is stored.
Posting guards to check the identification of people entering and exiting a security area
restricts access. Storing sensitive information in a fireproof cabinet ensures against loss
to some natural disasters. Newer physical measures that derive directly from the use of
automated information systems include biometric devices that check identities based
upon fingerprints, speech patterns or blood vessel patterns in the retina. Back-up
generators secure against power system failure.
Procedural mechanisms, which include both personnel and operating procedures,
are crucial because "[m]ore security breaches are caused by human error, often by well
intended people, than by other causes." [CEC93:22] One procedural mechanism that is
common to many industries is the practice of separation of duty. Separation of duty
ensures that no single individual has sole authority to execute a critical task. For
example, separation of duty decreases the opportunity for fraud by prohibiting the person
who places an order from also authorizing payment and receiving delivery. Other
procedural mechanisms include the accounting practice prohibiting erasures or the
DOD's hierarchical security classification system.
Automated controls, also referred to as logical controls, are a new class of
considerations for satisfying security objectives that stem directly from the use of
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information technologies; but logical controls involve more than simply automating
procedural mechanisms. Support for distributed processing and electronic
communications via wireless and wireline networks are also a part of automated controls.
Common automated control measures include encryption and access controls.
Just as security objectives are a combination of confidentiality, integrity and
availability, implementations are therefore a combination of physical, procedural and
automated mechanisms. Especially with information technologies, the tendency is to
focus on automated controls. However, an organization's information security needs
prescribe a system which "is an interdependent collection of components ... that involves
physical elements and people as well as computers and software." [NRC91:65]
1.3 How is information security verified
Unfortunately, establishing security objectives and enacting procedures and
mechanisms to implement those objectives is not enough. "Inadequacies in a system can
result either from a failure to understand requirements or from flaws in their
implementation." [NCS92:9] Verification is the process of evaluating what degree of
security is actually achieved by the security measures implemented within an
organization. Verification takes place at three different stages: security policy, security
model and implementation.
A security policy is an "informal specification of the rules by which people are
given access to a system to read and change information and to use resources."
[NRC91:77] It identifies the combination of confidentiality, integrity and availability
that is appropriate for a particular organization's goals. Ultimately, the security
mechanisms are implemented to satisfy these specifications. Consequently, it is
important to verify that the policy accurately reflects the information security needs and
desires of the organization.
22 Chapter One
To relate system behavior to security objectives, the policy is re-stated as a model
using formal mathematical constructs. A good model supports verification in three ways.
First, it is possible to mathematically evaluate whether there are any logical fallacies in
the policy. Second, the model guides the selection and implementation of mechanisms to
minimize the potential for inconsistencies between security requirements and system
design. Third, as the need for security changes over time, the model identifies how the
system should adjust. "A good model accurately represents the security policy that is
actually enforced by the system. Thus, it clarifies both the strengths and the potential
limitations of the policy." [NCS92: 10]
Regardless of how rigorous the theoretical analysis of security policy is, however,
satisfying information security objectives is ultimately dependent upon implementation.
The final stage of verification asks whether the mechanisms accurately implement the
policy. The implementation should restrict access and behavior as specified by
confidentiality and integrity constraints. Equally important is availability. The system
should not be more constraining than the policy requires.
Therefore, for an organization to be assured of achieving any degree of
information security requires proof that the security policy matches the organization's
needs and desires. Also, the security model used to guide the implementation must
correspond with the security policy, and the implementation itself must verifiably enforce
the model.
Underlying the entire verification process is the understanding that information
security is inherently an uncertain activity. Thus, at every stage, a critical component of
verification is risk analysis. The degree to which a security policy matches the
organization's needs and desires or that an implementation verifiably enforces the model
is not absolute. Information is only as secure as the weakest link in the system that is
processing it, and no matter how reliable the security measures, ultimately, the system
must rely upon people. History demonstrates that even the most reliable, well-
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intentioned users can err. [KAH67] Verification is the process of determining with what
degree of assurance - how reliably - an organization protects information.
1.4 A framework for information security studies
A complete study of information security therefore addresses both specification
and implementation issues. Specifications vary in degree of detail on a continuum from a
general list of objectives to a formal security model. In its formative stages, a security
specification should define the balance of confidentiality, integrity and availability
appropriate to an organization's needs. As a specification evolves towards greater detail,
each successive specification document should be rigorously analyzed to ensure that the
intent of the security objectives is accurately captured.
Figure 1.1
A framework for information security studies
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Implementations relate a security specification to specific security mechanisms.
Because of its precision, the security model provides guidance in selecting appropriate
physical, procedural and logical mechanisms as well as providing a means for verifying
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that the mechanisms correctly implement the security model. Correctness entails both
restricting undesirable behavior as well as enabling actions that are permitted without
unintentionally permitting unintended actions.
1.5 Focus of this thesis
This thesis will explore selected information security specification and
implementation considerations as they pertain to institutions sharing information
contained in a computer-based patient record. In particular, this thesis will explore
security policy and the procedural and logical mechanisms to support confidentiality
requirements of computer-based patient records.
To address confidentiality, the different players who seek access to sensitive,
patient-identifiable medical information are first identified. More than a decade ago,
researchers were already documenting the growing demand for personal medical data, not
only to enhance the delivery of care, but also to support quality assurance and
accreditation practices as well as to fulfill public policy and social objectives. [WES76;
BRC84] However, access should be tempered by the purposes for which the information
is necessary. Neither will all individuals and institutions need access to the entire record
nor will they all need the ability to write in the record or to copy and re-distribute
portions of the record.
The technology and policy of resolving security concerns encompasses logical,
procedural and physical mechanisms. This thesis focuses on the implementation of
logical mechanisms to support the security of computerized patient records. At the same
time, it recognizes that physical and procedural measures play an equally important role
in ensuring the security of computerized, sensitive patient information.
Because of the breadth of information security studies, many issues, while no less
relevant or critical, are not addressed in this thesis. In addition to physical and procedural
mechanisms, availability and communications are two such issues. Availability requires
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that timely, accurate information be readily available to all individuals with a legitimate
need to know. This concern raises issues such as replication, concurrency control,
reliability and fault tolerant computing. Communications security, protecting information
while in transit between institutions or players is another subject beyond the scope of this
thesis. Encryption technologies for electronic communications or the use of smart cards
to enable patients to transport personal medical information are currently a subject of
great study.4
4 As referenced in footnote 2, for further information on technologies for secure communications, see OTA87, NRC91
and FRD94. For further information on smart card technology, see OTA93 and ALP93.
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Chapter Two
The Computerized Patient Record
This chapter uses the framework introduced in Chapter 1 to identify security risks
posed by sharing sensitive, electronic medical records within and between institutions.
There is an increasing demand for access to individually-identifiable information
in the patient health record. The burgeoning list includes health professionals who
provide care, administrators and accrediting organizations that monitor the quality of
care, managers who make financial decisions and third party payers that determine
reimbursement. [BRC84; WES76; OTA93]
The need and ability to electronically share information among the myriad parties
who desire or require access raises many security issues. 5 Many of these problems are
inherent risks of electronic record-keeping and have little to do with content. Other
vulnerabilities may be unique to medical records and are unaffected, mitigated, or
exacerbated by the shift from paper to electronic media.
As background, the chapter begins by introducing the concept of a federated
environment. Next, the chapter defines the paper-based patient record and relates that
record to the concept of a federation. Security risks that arise from both inter- and intra-
institutional use of the paper record are identified. This chapter then considers the
5 Unless otherwise specified, future references to 'information security' imply confidentiality concerns that arise from
sharing information among multiple parties.
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implementation of the computerized patient record (CPR) as a federation to explore
security issues that arise from the migration to information systems. "However, merely
automating the form, content and procedures of current patient records will perpetuate
their deficiencies and will be insufficient to meet emerging user needs." [IOM91:2]
Therefore, the chapter concludes by reviewing proposals for an expanded patient record.
New and changing risks are noted. Security objectives are identified.
2.1 What is a federated environment
A database system consists of automated information management software called
a database management system, and a structured collection of information called a
database. [HEM85:256; SHE90:183] Afederated database system (also referred to as a
federated system) is "a collection of cooperating but autonomous component database
systems." [SHE90: 183] A federated environment (also referred to as afederation)
includes both a federated database system and the community of users that access the
information within the constituent databases that comprise the federated system.
The centerpiece of a federation is the federated database system. Although the
research literature varies quite widely in its interpretation of a federated system, at least
three key concepts are generally shared by most researchers in the field: distribution,
heterogeneity, and autonomy.
In a federated environment, information is drawn from many different user
populations, each of which may have its own database system. As a consequence, data
resources may be distributed physically or logically. Data that is distributed physically is
divided among multiple computer systems that are either "co-located or geographically
distributed but interconnected by a communication system." [SHE90: 185] Data this is
logically divided is stored and managed on a single computer system. For example, this
thesis is bound as a single volume but is logically divided into chapters.
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A second characteristic of federations is the heterogeneity between the constituent
database systems. Both syntactic and semantic differences might exist. Syntactic
heterogeneities include differences in data representation and in query language. [SHE90]
With respect to data representation, some database systems might employ an object-
oriented model while others use a relational model. Furthermore, the query language
used to access information within the database may differ.
Even if two database systems are syntactically identical, they may still differ
semantically. "Semantic heterogeneity occurs when there is a disagreement about the
meaning, interpretation, or intended use of the same or related data." [SHE90: 187] Does
the data item "cost" include tax? Does the data item "name" list last name first and first
name last or vice versa? What about the middle initial?
Heterogeneity within a federation may also stem from differences in the software
and hardware infrastructure that supports the constituent database systems. At the
operating system level, file systems, naming conventions, transaction support, and
interprocess commur.ication may be implemented in different ways. Inconsistent
hardware may also complicate data sharing. [SHE90]
Autonomy is perhaps the defining characteristic of a federated system. That
members of a federated system may elect to use incompatible syntactic structures or
inconsistent semantic conventions is only one facet of autonomy within a federation.
Autonomy also includes control of data sharing and control of data viewing. [HEM85]
Autonomy over data sharing ensures that each system participating in the
federation determines how much information it chooses to share with other members of
the federation. Negotiation is the process whereby two or more constituents within the
federation determine what data is shared and agree on the terms and conditions under
which that data is shared.6
6 The 'terms and conditions' refer to such issues as how long the recipient may continue to share the information, access
controls on the information, and the sender's obligations regarding updating information to ensure that the recipient has
current data.
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Data viewing includes the right of each constituent to receive the shared data in a
consistent format. Because of the different semantic and syntactic heterogeneities,
information shared with and received from a foreign database system should be translated
into the recipient system's native format to provide transparency to users.
In the current information landscape, "databases have proliferated across a variety
of networks, each under the control of a different organization, and with very little
standardization among them." [ALO91:305] Federations are a response to the increasing
economic and political pressure for institutions to share information and interoperate
between "the plethora of legacy systems which were designed independently" and the
"newer object-oriented and relational systems." [MOR92: 131]
2.2 What is the patient health record
Traditionally, the individually-identifiable portions of the health record comprise
the document which is "used by health professionals while providing patient care services
to review patient data or document their own observations, actions, or instructions."
[IOM9 1:11 ] Even before the introduction of information technologies, however, the
health record had begun to evolve into much more. "How much more" can be
operationally defined in terms of the confidentiality and integrity requirements of the
health record: who wants access to the health record and why?
Users, defined as individual or institutional players who wish to access patient-
identifiable portions of the record, are often divided into two or more different categories
depending upon their intended use of the information. The Department of Health and
Human Services suggests four classes of users. [GOS93] Westin, in his report to the
National Bureau of Standards (now the National Institute of Standards and Technology)
defines three. [WES76] The Institute of Medicine [IOM9 1; IOM94] and the Office of
Technology Assessment [OTA93] each describe their own taxonomy. Regardless, all
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agree on there being a distinction between use of the patient record while in the course of
providing patient care and use for any other reason.
Figure 2.1
Classification of health record users into zones
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Primary users of the health record are those who access the patient record while in
the course of providing patient care. To the primary care physician, then, the record
registers "important medical benchmarks ... history and physical examination, a list of the
patient's problems, diagnostic tests and procedures performed, the results of these tests,
[and] monitoring done." [LIN92:4] For hospitalized patients, it is also a working
document that records unverified concerns about possible conditions and coordinates "the
Figure 2.2
Classification of health record users into spheres
Source: GOS93 citing the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Task Force on Privacy
The Computerized Patient Record 33
tactics of everyday care: nursing care plans, input-output records ... and notes that
coordinate one nursing shift to the next." [LIN92:4]
But providing patient care involves more than just physicians and nurses.
Laboratory technicians, medical specialists, social workers, and pharmacists all
participate in the delivery of care and their notes also contribute to the record. Support
staff often maintain files independent of the document stored in the medical records
department. Because departmental records often contain information unavailable in the
central, paper file, the complete patient record is a compilation of many separate
documents:
[S]ocial service departmental files might contain information describing a
patient's habits, finances, family crises, or other sensitive personal facts.
Other ancillary service departmental files might similarly contain sensitive
or technical information not housed in the primary health record.
[IOM91:13]
"Information kept in one such file may also be of relevance in another, so that the
patient's hospital record becomes several different files that may overlap and are often
maintained in separate places." [OTA93:45] Moreover, because of the population's
increasing age and mobility, the complete document may consist of records from
laboratories, clinics, and hospitals throughout the country. Table 2.1 provides a more
extensive list of primary users who access the record in the course of providing direct
patient care.
Table 2. la
Institutions who are primary users
Community clinics External laboratories Nursing homes
(includes public schools) Health Maintenance Outpatient surgery
Community Health Information Organizations (HMOs) Pharmacies
Networks (CHINs) Home health care agencies Private practitioners
Correctional facilities Hospices Psychiatric facilities
Donor banks Hospitals Specialty care clinics
Emergent care clinics Military services Substance abuse programs
Sources: CHM92, HHS93b, IOM91, WED92 and WES76
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Table 2.lb
Primary users within the primary use institutions
Assistant Dentist Pharmacist Therapist
Clinical Dietitian Physician Occupational
Nurse Nurse Social worker Physical
Physician Optometrist Technician Radiation
Chaplain Patient Laboratory Respiratory
Dental hygienist Patient's family Radiology
Sources: IOM91 and WES76
Secondary users, then, include all those other players who seek access to the
patient record. To a current reader, the most familiar of these might be the third-party
payer or medical insurer. "Patient data now are used for coverage decisions (e.g.,
preadmission review) as well as for payment" [IOM91:22] "The patient accounts
department is responsible for obtaining patient-identifiable information, such as
diagnostic and therapeutic items needed to determine benefits entitlement and to process
payment claims for services provided." [BRC84:47]
As with primary users, the ranks of secondary users and list of uses is very
diverse. Within the medical establishment itself, the uses of individual patient records for
purposes other than that individual's care has been growing. "To develop budgets,
measure productivity and costs and assess market position, managers of institutions seek
to link financial and patient care information." [OTA93:3 1] "Quality assurance activities
such as utilization review, infection control, health record review, risk management and
drug surveillance are some examples of functional responsibilities for which record
access is legitimate." [BRC84:34] "Such activities are a requirement for accreditation of
hospitals by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO)." [IOM91:21] Table 2.2 provides a more extensive list of secondary users and
their respective uses of the record.
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Table 2.2a
Secondary uses of information
Accreditation/care management
Quality assurance - assess compliance
with standards of care, compare health care
institutions
Risk management - identify at-risk
populations
Utilization review - perform outcomes
and cost effectiveness research
professional accreditation
Education
Continuing education for current professionals
Dental
Medical
Nursing
Public health
Evaluative decisions
Employment
Insurers - non-medical (e.g., life, automobile,
fire, etc.)
Licensing
Social services
Information systems support
Maintenance
Upgrades
Legal
Investigations
Proceedings against a drug or equipment
manufacturer (e.g., failure to warn,
negligence, etc.)
Legal (cont'd)
Proceedings involving the patient (e.g.,
court ordered psychiatric evaluation,
personal disputes, etc.)
Proceedings against the provider
(e.g., malpractice)
Patient health care support
For the patient
For the patient's family
Public policy interest
Disease reporting (e.g., Center for Disease
Control)
Social services (e.g., Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, etc.)
Social welfare (e.g., births, deaths, etc.)
Violent crimes (e.g., suspected child abuse,
knife and gunshot wounds, etc.)
Reimbursement
Federal
Private
State
Research
Public policy
Medical research
clinical trials
new products
Technology development
assess new technologies
marketing strategies
Sources: CHM92, HHS93b, IOM91, WED92 and WES76
Therefore, the complete patient health record is really a composite document. The
patient-identifiable information that comprises the complete health record is either
contained or duplicated in the files of numerous hospital departments, clinics, ancillary
health care support institutions, accreditation organizations, government regulatory
agencies and social service offices. Although the primary reason for maintaining patient
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information remains the delivery of health care, the number and variety of secondary uses
equals or exceeds the number and variety of institutions that store the information.
Table 2.2b
Secondary users corresponding to the secondary uses
Accreditation/care management
Accreditation organizations (e.g.,
Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations)
Consultants
Professional organizations (e.g.,
American Medical Association)
Third party administrators
Education
Faculty
Health science journalists
Students
Evaluative decisions
Employers
Government agencies
Insurers - non-medical (e.g., life, automobile,
fire, etc.)
Professional organizations
Information systems support
Developers
Staff
Technicians
Legal
Judges
Law enforcement authorities
Lawyers
Patient health care support
Support groups
Public policy interest
Media
Law enforcement authorities
Local, state and Federal officials
Reimbursement
Claims evaluators
Research, public policy
Alcohol, drug abuse and mental
health administration
Center for Disease Control
Death registry
Food and Drug Administration
National Center for health Statistics
Research, medical
Academic institutions
National Institute of Health
National Library of Medicine
Research, technology
Academic institutions
Equipment vendors
Pharmaceutical industry
Sources: CHM92, HHS93b, IOM9 1, WED92 and WES76
2.3 Confidentiality and integrity of the health record
Historically, the health care community has largely depended on the "'small
village' property of the visible workplace. It is assumed that the staff that come together
on a nursing floor know each other and are observant. ... Much has depended on trust."
[LIN92:13] In an environment that shares information within and between institutions,
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assumptions of trust can break down. The increasing demand for personal medical data,
whether the information is represented in electronic format or not, raises many challenges
to maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of the record.
Confidentiality concerns, which include redisclosure and over disclosure, are
particularly vulnerable to the breakdown of trust. When information is shared between
two parties, redisclosure is the unauthorized release of the shared data, whether accidental
or intentional, by the recipient to some other user. [WED92; BRC84] "Ultimately, the
use or abuse of a system is a function of the human beings who operate it," and human
error is a leading cause of security breaches. [BRC84: 106; CEC93] Moreover, third-
party recipients may not be subject to the same legal or ethical constraints.7 Redisclosure
underlies the common strategy of seeking secondary sources if initially thwarted.
Over disclosure is a second hazard of information sharing. "With existing paper
systems, requests for information often result in the release of data that are not pertinent
to the current request, as total documents are photocopied and/or faxed to users.
[GOS93:2491] Many users with a legitimate need to access specific portions of the
record have neither the need nor the authority to access the complete record. Medical
researchers are often prohibited from viewing information that would reveal the identity
of a human subject. At the extreme, mental health records are a subset of the complete
patient file that are restricted, even under subpoena, to all but a few users. [TIN90] While
delivering the complete medical record rather than selected notes may not appear to pose
much of a risk, the nature of the threat is clarified when considered in conjunction with
the potential for redisclosure. Sharing only as much information as is necessary can limit
subsequent harm.
The motivation to constrain disclosure is not absolute, however. A policy
restricting access must be tempered by the reality that "even unauthorized personnel
7 The issue of ethical and legal constraints is expanded upon in Chapter 3.
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might need to have access to patient records under emergency situations." [HAM92a: 13]
Patient safety must always have priority over confidentiality.8
Threats to integrity due to information sharing are also related to trust. When
preparing reports and forms, there is always the danger of making inadvertent errors.
Information sharing exacerbates the risk because there is no guarantee that users in
different institutions will conform to similar standards of behavior. Departments or
institutions may write or update the record in unauthorized or inconsistent ways. Record
entries may vary from a scattered collection of free form notes documenting a patient's
status to a regimented list of diagnostic tests and results. For still others, the record may
serve more for "correspondence and reports rather than as a well organized chronology of
health care." [IOM91:19]
The danger of data corruption is tempered by regulations that mandate that,
depending upon the state, the source institution must preserve the original record for a
specified number of years or until the patient reaches their majority, whichever is longer.
[ALP93] Additionally, the medical establishment has adopted the financial industries
convention against erasure or overwriting. [BRC84] Consequently, if a patient returns
from a hospital stay to her home clinic, at the very worst, only that documentation
specific to the hospital stay would be inconsistent.
2.4 Automation of the patient record
To recognize the information security implications of sharing information in an
electronic rather than a paper environment, it is helpful to first understand what
automation entails. Consider the users and their respective uses of the record. The effect
of automation on users and their respective uses noted earlier is experienced in changes to
the record's form and content as well as the procedures by which the information is
handled. Automation also introduces a new collection of users and uses.
8Note that medical emergencies as an exception to medical confidentiality is in direct contrast to the mandatory access
control policy implemented by the Department of Defense which explicitly excludes exceptions to disclosure rules.
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Changes to the form of the electronic record are exemplified by the presentation
format. The flexibility of automated systems permits individual users to arrange and
display information in the manner most suited to their needs rather than being bound to a
generic, paper form. [IOM93; IOM94] Content, while largely unaffected in substance,
more accurately reflects the longitudinal, composite nature of the document. As an
individual patient ages, portions of the record become scattered throughout different
clinics, medical specialists and private physicians' offices. Electronic communication
networks permit multiple users to simultaneously, transparently access portions of the
record that may be stored in disparate locations. This provides a complete, "longitudinal"
view of the patient's health from birth to the present day. [GAB94] In exchange for
increased openness, medical records personnel must alter their practices not only for
storage of electronic rather than paper storage media but also for distribution of the
record.
Automation also opens the record to new communities of users and enables new
uses for medical information. Cross-matching and filtering are two extremely powerful
functions supported by computerization that have created new markets for information.
"Certainly there are those who would pay handsomely for a mailing list of individuals
guaranteed to have hemorrhoids, but not so handsomely that someone would pour [sic]
over relatively chaotic paper charts to surreptitiously compile it." [LIN92:7] Both old
users such as medical researchers [IOM94] and a new industry of third-party, direct-
marketing information re-sellers benefit. [LIN92; OTA93]
One set of new users is the direct result of procedural changes to how progress
notes and test results are entered into the record. Handwriting and voice-recognition
capabilities continue to be experimental at best. Instead, commercial automated medical
records systems instruct physicians to record information on pre-set encounter forms.
Medical transcriptionists then enter these handwritten notes and charts into an
information system. [SHO90; WKS93] A second set of new users are a direct result of
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the technology itself. The tasks of equipment installation, software implementation and
support all require access to real data. [BR093] Within the medical establishment,
information systems divisions are a new set of users. Because not all problems can be
solved in-house, equipment vendors and information systems consultants will also
occasionally require access.
Figure 2.3
The computer patient record as a federation
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Source: adapted from WED92:9
The integration of information technologies into the practice of health record
sharing produces tradeoffs in information security threats. Over disclosure is mitigated
because "[with] computerized systems, tailored selection of data items from an individual
health record is easy, thereby making it possible to share only the information that is
necessary to the inquiry at hand." [GOS93:2491] Likewise, automation supports integrity
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by constraining user behavior. Administrators could enforce the restriction on erasure
and limit those with the ability to update specific portions of the record.
Conversely, automation may exacerbate the risk of redisclosure. Electronic
storage greatly simplifies the task of copying and re-transmitting an entire record or
selected portions. Unlike access to a single paper record, an electronic record is a
'virtual' document that can reveal the patient's entire history, not just what is contained in
one clinician's paper file. Moreover, access to a single electronic database is equivalent
to accessing thousands of sensitive, 'virtual' documents:
Ironically, it is this 'negative' aspect of the paper medium (its
cumbersome nature that has minimized [the potential damages that could
accrue from] breaches of confidentiality. Although a breach could occur if
someone gained access to health records or insurance claim forms, the
magnitude of the breach was limited by the sheer difficulty of
unobtrusively reviewing large numbers of records or claim forms.
[WED92:4-17]
That digital storage facilitates redisclosure may be tempered by the arguable effectiveness
of audit trails that monitor and record behavior to deter illegitimate use.9 [DRI93]
In summary, introducing automation extends access to a broader array of users
and uses. Simultaneously, information systems foster novel changes to the form, content
and procedures involved in record keeping. The resulting computerized record better
addresses some of the previous threats to confidentiality and integrity while magnifying
others.
2.5 Vision for the future electronic record
Simply automating the existing health record does not fully realize the promise of
information technologies, however. Many patients are "beset by multiple problems
simultaneously, and require, for example, not just prenatal care, but housing, drug
treatment and vocational training as well.... [Care] received by such [patients] is likely to
contain gaps and redundancies because no one provider can see the whole picture...."
9 Define what an audit trail is and indicate that it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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[HHS93a: 1] In its efforts to coordinate the delivery of health care and social services, the
Federal Government envisions a much broader set of users and uses of the computerized
patient record:
[The government recognizes] the need for electronic data sharing and
communications technologies that would allow community providers
across diverse agencies and care modalities to communicate easily with
one another and to redirect or shape their collective resources on a case-
by-case basis to meet the complex needs of families who experience
multiple dysfunctions.
[HHS93b:2]
The future electronic record would therefore serve more than just the health care
community. Data in the virtual document could support such programs as the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children [AFDC] or the Department of Agriculture's Food
stamps program. The Department of Justice [DOJ] could incorporate health records into
criminal records such as drug and alcohol abuse, psychiatric evaluations, or treatments for
violent crimes. 10
As with any significant change, re-defining the electronic record by expanding the
set of users and uses affects information confidentiality and integrity. Risk of
redistribution is exacerbated due simply to the increased number of users with access.
This risk is compounded by inconsistencies between the security requirements of the
different institutions who contribute to and share the virtual document. For example,
substance abuse records are subject to unique, more restrictive controls. [OTA93] In
direct conflict to this mandate is the legitimate need of many users to review the entire
patient health record. When portions of the medical history are incorporated into
substance abuse records, whether individual privacy or the needs of the information user
prevails is unclear.
As another example, records sealed under court order may prove accessible when
defined as a portion of the medical history. That information unavailable in one venue is
vulnerable to a persistent user who can simply look elsewhere is also related to the risk of
10
'he introduction of smart cards to enhance both the security and the portability of records is another element of the
future electronic record that is beyond the scope of this thesis. See ALP93 and OTA93 for further references.
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over disclosure. Automation permits the ability to tailor what information is released to a
particular user for a particular purpose; but by approaching different users and combining
the portions of the record for which each respective user is authorized, it may be possible
to infer information that is not directly revealed. l 1
Problems related to the number of users are not unique to electronic record
keeping. When sharing information, the paper records currently employed by health care
and social services related organizations are similarly vulnerable to differences in
conventions and malicious individuals who combine information from more than one
user. However, electronic records magnify the problems. Information technologies
simplify the coordination costs of increasing the number of institutions that contribute
information to the virtual document. In doing so, communications technologies also
increase the number of users with access to each patient record, thereby simplifying the
malicious user's ability to derive confidential information through indirect means.12
Critical threats facing the confidentiality of information shared across a federation
are related to disclosure and inference. Specifically, challenges include: over disclosure,
redisclosure, inference and aggregation. Accordingly, the security objectives addressed
in the remainder of this thesis are to control over disclosure and redisclosure and to limit
opportunities for aggregation and inference.
1ILoosely defined, obtaining confidential information through indirect means such as collecting pieces from different
sources and inferring what is not provided is referred to as a covert channel.
12The extended computerized medical record will certainly also have significant implications for identification,
authentication, audit, and other security issues that are beyond the scope of this thesis.
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Chapter Three
Security Policy
Having identified relevant security objectives, this chapter reviews elements of a
security policy to mitigate the risks of sharing sensitive, medical information in a
federated environment. The chapter begins by surveying elements of existing, proposed
and pending policies related to the protection of confidential patient information as an
initial point from which to draw ideas. Issues that a security policy would have to
address in order to meet the objectives are then elicited from this survey.
The role that technologies play in the policy making process is a thread which
runs throughout this policy evaluation. As observed earlier, technology is only part of a
comprehensive solution.13 The rapid obsolescence of today's computers suggests the
need for broad, general policy statements that do not rely upon or refer to specific
technologies. Conversely, policies should be written with existing technological
capabilities in mind. By acknowledging the technology, security policy writers attempt
to ensure that their policies neither require unreasonable means to satisfy the objectives
nor overlook new capabilities that simplify the task.14 [OTA93; BRA92] Technology
"can pre-exist any legal structure or be established as the result of one." [OTA93:86]
1 3 People remain the greatest barrier. [NRC9 1]
14 Brannigan cites the case of the 1976 Medical Device Amendments that called for the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to regulate software through premarket approval or product standards. The legislation required "a technical tool
that can test a given piece of software and determine how safe it is. Such a tool did not exist." [BRA92, 192]
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3.1 Policy survey
Although computerized patient records are only now becoming a mainstream
element of health care provision, information technologies have long existed both in
government and in the health care arena. 15 As a consequence, concerns for the privacy
and security of electronically stored information have already been addressed many times
in previous policy initiatives. As a first step in considering policies for addressing the
confidentiality objectives identified in this thesis, existing, model and proposed policies
are compared and contrasted.
A total of ten different policies ranging from state and Federal legislation to codes
of conduct are considered. The policies are summarized below. A more extensive
analysis is included as Appendix A. The survey includes four Federal policies, three
policies adopted state wide and three policies promulgated by industry. From the
perspective of authority, four of the ten policies have been enacted by Federal or state
Table 3.1
Policies surveyed
The Privacy Act of 1974
The Computer Security Act of 1987
American Hospital Association Information Management Advisory on the Disclosure of Medical Record
Information
American Health Information Management Association Health Information Model Legislation Language
Workgroup on Electronic Data Interchange Model Federal Legislation for the Confidentiality of Health
Care Information
Medical Society of the State of New York Ethical Tenets for Protection of Confidential Clinical Data
State of Montana Uniform Health Care Information Act
Massachusetts State Code on Insurance Information and Privacy Protection
The Fair Health Information Practices Act of 1994, HR4077
The Health Security Act of 1994, HR3600
legislatures. Of the remaining six, two are currently before Congress, two are model
1 5Record keeping, billing, scheduling, patient directory information, and hospital census are only a few of the myriad
services to which information technologies have traditionally been applied in the medical care setting.
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language for legislation and two have been adopted and/or endorsed by professional
organizations but do not carry the authority of legislation. The analysis of policy
mechanisms intended to address disclosure and inference related threats in each of the
policies surveyed is included as Appendix A. The policies themselves are summarized
below.
Privacy Act of 1974
The Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a) forms the centerpiece of all Federal
legislation related to information privacy. The Privacy Act, which includes the Computer
Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 and subsequent amendments, "was
designed to protect individuals from government disclosure of confidential information."
[WED92:4-8] The fundamental premise is that individuals should control the use of
information about themselves.
Structured around the five key principles of Fair Information Practices1 6 identified
by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1973, the Privacy Act
applies to the collection, storage, or use of any individually identifiable information
maintained by any Federal agency on any storage medium. The scope of the Act includes
"healthcare [sic] facilities operated by the Federal government: the Veterans'
Administration, Department of Defense and Indian Health Service." [BRN93:60]
Specifically, the Act requires that there "be a way for individuals to prevent information
about them, obtained for one purpose, from being used or made available for other
purposes without their consent." [OTA93:77]
6The basic principles of fair information practices were stated in Computers and the Rights of Citizens, a report
published by the Privacy Commission of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1973. The report
identified five key principles:
a. There must be no secret personal data record-keeping system.
b. There must be a way for individuals to discover what personal information is recorded and how it is used.
c. There must be a way for individuals to prevent information about them, obtained for one purpose, from being
used or made available for other purposes without their consent.
d. There must be a way for individuals to correct or amend a record of information about themselves.
e. An organization creating, maintaining, using or disseminating records of identifiable personal data must assure the
reliability of the data for its intended use and must take reasonable precautions to prevent misuses of the data.
[IOTA93, 77]
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Despite its intentions, however, the protections offered by the Privacy Act are far
from absolute. The Privacy Act, as well as the subsequent and proposed legislation
described below, acknowledge a greater social interest in permitting the disclosure of
individually identifiable information in specific situations without the individual's
consent. Public health statistics such as births and deaths, or release in response to
judicial proceedings are two such instances. Appendix A provides a more complete
listing of instances that might justify unauthorized disclosure.
Moreover, the Privacy Act applies only to information collected by the Federal
government. "Although some states have adopted the provisions of the Privacy Act,
there are still many states in which there are no laws establishing the framework for use
and disclosure of patient information for research purposes." [WPR93:D7] As a second
example, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), under the broadly defined
"routine use" clause, 17 authorized the release of the Uniform Clinical Data Set (UCDS) to
researchers complete with patient names and identifiers. [WED92] The UCDS is
comprised of patient records collected by Medicare Peer Review Organizations (PROs).
With regard to enforcement, the Privacy Act "places the burden of monitoring
privacy in information and redressing wrongs entirely with the individual, providing no
government oversight mechanism for the system." [OTA93:79] Moreover, "the Act
contains no specific measures that must be in place to protect privacy so that it cannot be
used to describe what technical measures must be taken to achieve compliance"
[OTA93:79; BRA92]
Computer Security Act of 1987
The Computer Security Act of 1987 recognized the Federal government's
increasing reliance upon computer systems and argued that "improving the security and
privacy of sensitive information in Federal computer systems is in the public interest, and
1 7 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)2.
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hereby creates a means for establishing minimum acceptable security practices for
systems ...." [15 U.S.C. 271:§2(a)] Specifically, all Federal agencies were required to:
"(1) identify all developmental and operational systems with sensitive information, (2)
develop and submit to NIST and NSA18 for advice and comment a security and privacy
plan for each system identified and (3) establish computer security training programs."
[GAO90:2]
Provisions of the Act extend to health care data under the definition of "sensitive
information." The Act defines "sensitive information" as "any information, the loss,
misuse, or unauthorized access or modification of which could adversely affect ... the
privacy to which individuals are entitled under section 552 of title 5, United States Code
(the Privacy Act ) ...." [15 U.S.C. 271:§20(d)(4)]
Unfortunately, the General Accounting Office (GAO) determined that, in the
years following adoption, "[t]he planning and review process ... did little to strengthen
computer security governmentwide [sic]." [GAO90: 1] Moreover, at the time of the GAO
study, little progress had been made beyond the planning stage. "[B]udget constraints
and inadequate top management support - in terms of resources and commitment - were
key reasons why controls had not been implemented." 19 [GAO90:2]
Weaknesses of the Computer Security Act include its vagueness and lack of
enforcement. "Many agency officials misinterpreted or found the guidance unclear as to
how systems were to be combined in the [security] plans, the definition of some key
terms (e.g., "in place"), the level of expected detail ...." [GAO90:5] Moreover, the
Computer Security Act imposes no criminal penalties for failure to comply. [GOR92]
Because "[t]he costs of detection resistance and recovery can be both tangible and high ...
18 NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology, formerly the National Bureau of Standards) and NSA
(National Security Agency).
19 Specifically, 22 security plans collected from Federal agencies were reviewed. Of the 145 planned security controls
contained in the 22 security plans, only 38% had been implemented as of January 1990. Of those remaining, "[o]nly
4% had implementation dates beyond January 1990." [GAO90:6]
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[while] there are no generally applicable methods for estimating the potential costs" of
security breaches, the incentive to comply is likely to be small. [CEC93:19]
American Hospital Association (AHA)
"A common theme emerging from the current legal and regulatory framework is
that the obligation to protect confidentiality of healthcare information rests primarily with
healthcare providers." [BR093:44] Because of this theme, and perhaps partially in
response to the increasing use of information technologies to maintain sensitive patient
data, the AHA revised its Guidelines on Institutional Policies for Disclosure of Medical
Record Information in 1990. The guidelines are independent of storage medium and
address "both internal and external disclosures ... [and explicitly] indicate the situations in
which medical record information may or may not be released ...." [AHA90: 1]
As a professional organization, however, the AHA lacks the enforcement power
of legislation. The AHA distributes guidelines, not edicts. Consequently, even within the
community of medical institutions, identifiable patient information is not necessarily
afforded consistent protection.
Additionally, because they do not carry the weight of regulation or law, guidelines
promulgated by provider institutions apply only to providers. Meanwhile, health records
today are "no longer simply a tool for health care providers." 20 [IOM94:4-4] Unless
identical guidelines are adopted by each individual community of users, the security of
the medical record from unauthorized disclosure and inference will be in a constant state
of flux. Protection will be uncertain at best.
2 0 See Chapter 2 for a discussion about the growing number of users and uses of patient information.
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American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA)
Recognizing the hazards of inconsistent guidelines across the diverse community
of patient record users, "AHIMA has developed model [Federal] confidentiality
legislation to meet this need." [BRN93:60]
The 1993 AHIMA model language is "based on the patients' need to access their
own health care information and the need for clear rules about disclosure of that
information." [OTA93:77] It incorporates the Fair Information Practices from the 1973
Privacy Commission21 and enumerates conditions for disclosure of patient information.
Also, recognizing that users are no longer limited exclusively to the medical community,
the AHIMA model language explicitly states that conditions expressed within the model
text "shall apply both to disclosures of health information and to redisclosures of health
information by a person to whom health care information is disclosed." [AHI93:§103(a)]
"The model language also addresses proper use and disclosure of health care information
by secondary users." [OTA93:77]
Li e other efforts, however, the AHIMA proposal "provides for no oversight or
enforcement mechanism for the system." [OTA93:77] Consequently, the rules may
provide uniform coverage if observed; unfortunately, there is little incentive to abide by
the regulations.
Workgroup on Electronic Data Interchange (WEDI)
WEDI grew out of a forum of national health care leaders convened by then
Secretary of Health and Human Services Louis Sullivan in November 1991 to discuss
alternatives for reining in the enormous administrative costs of providing health care.
Specifically, WEDI was charged with realizing the benefits of electronic data interchange
(EDI) for exchanging and processing all manners of health information including patient
records. [WED92]
2 1See footnote reference number 16 on Fair Information Practices.
52 Chapter Three
"Recognizing the inherent tension between the need for liberal interchange of
identifiable, personal health information and the need to preserve the confidentiality of
such information," WEDI called for and later drafted model Federal, preemptive
legislation, "to facilitate and ensure the uniform, confidential treatment of identifiable
information in electronic environments." [BR093:42]
WEDI's model legislation, like that of other proposals and guidelines, explicitly
enumerates conditions for disclosure. However, WEDI eases the conditions for
disclosure between providers and payers to a par with disclosure between two health care
providers involved in the immediate delivery of care. [WED93a:§3C] Therefore, unlike
other proposals, although WEDI would require providers to maintain a log of disclosures,
disclosure to payers would not be included in the log. [WED93a:§6B]
A second deviation WEDI takes from other proposals lies in its "use" restriction.
Most proposals adopt the Fair Information Practices language from the 1973 Privacy
Commission and limit use to the purposes for which the information was collected or
received. WEDI loosens that restriction to permit any "legitimate purpose for which the
individual has granted consent." [WED93a:§5B(2)] The significance of the distinction
depends upon whether consent must be received prior to collecting the information and/or
whether blanket consents are acceptable.2 2
Ethical Tenets of the Medical Society of the State of New York
The Ethical Tenets for Protection of Confidential Clinical Data were originally
drafted as part of a Joint Task Force on Confidentiality of Computerized Records
convened in 1968. The Tenets were subsequently adopted by the Medical Society of the
State of New York. Although some sections are open to broader interpretation, "[u]nlike
the more general approach of the Privacy Act, the Ethical Tenets speak directly to
specific concerns encountered in the area of health care information." [OTA93:77]
2 2 Neither scenario is addressed in the WEDI draft legislation.
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Providers are bound to keep all treatment related information in strictest
confidence. [ETH93:§2] Any use of identifiable information that is "not a part of the
patient's treatment and not a part of professional communication to contribute to the care
of the patient" qualifies as secondary use. [ETH93:§9] Use of secondary information is
tightly bound "only for the original purpose for which [it was] generated and shall be
promptly destroyed, or at least disidentified [sic], as promptly as possible." [ETH93:§ 10]
The Tenets are also extremely restrictive with respect to disclosure. The Tenets
stipulate that "[i]dentified secondary clinical records shall receive confidential treatment"
without specifying the terms or conditions of "confidential treatment." [ETH93:§9]
Furthermore, for any public health or research use of secondary records, "the informed
consent and explicit formal authorization of the patient or his guardian shall be sought
and attained prior to such release." [ETH93:§ 10]
However, although it is unclear, the Tenets seem to apply only to providers. 2 3
Second, the requirement that secondary records receive confidential treatment is not
accompanied by a definition of what constitutes "confidential treatment." [TH93:§9]
As with any non-legislative solution, that the Tenets "have never had the force of
law in any jurisdiction" weakens its authority. [OTA93:77] Lack of legislative clout is
further compounded by non-uniformity. According to the Tenets, "[e]ach data center
handling identified medical data shall formulate and maintain its own operational rules
and practices," introducing the potential for inconsistent protection across providers.
[ETH93:§ 12]
Montana State Uniform Health Care Information Act (UHCIA)
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws convened in
the early 1980's "to stimulate uniformity among states on health information
23The Tenets explicitly apply to "all clinical data centers storing patient records ...." [ETH §8] However, as
operationally defined, a 'clinical data center" ranges from "a solo practitioner's office computer to large hospital-based
data centers and regional data systems, if these data centers regularly store patient records." [ETH §8]
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management issues." [BRN93:60] The commissioners were motivated, in part, by the
"'the use of health-care information for non health-care purposes; ... and the exponential
increase in the use of computers and automated information systems for health-care
record information ...' UHCIA Prefatory Note." [WED92:4-11] The Uniform Health
Care Information Act that resulted is included in this survey as enacted by the State of
Montana in 1987.
Like the broader Privacy Act, the UHCIA does not "focus specifically on the
problems presented by computerization of [patient] information. Many of the provisions
of the UHCIA are applicable in both a computerized or non computerized environment."
[OTA93:77] Both vulnerabilities and possible solutions might be overlooked by failing
to consider the existing technologies.
The UHCIA represents both an attempt to preserve the discretion of individual
states in setting health care information legislation and an example of uniform state
legislation to provide consistent regulation (as opposed to preemptive Federal
legislation). Unfortunately, to date, "it has been adopted by only two states - Montana
and Washington." [BRN93:60]
A second potential weakness of the UHCIA stems from the Commissioner's
belief that "rules for use and release of health information should be developed according
to the group that holds the information, not the type of information that is held."
[WED92:4-1 1] Protection that does not single out types of information contrasts with
existing practices such as state laws which explicitly single out AIDS related
complications24 or Federal statutes which "prescribe special confidentiality rules for the
records of patients who seek drug or alcohol treatment at Federally funded facilities." 2 5
[WED92:4-9]
2 4 See the discussion on the Massachusetts State insurance legislation that appears further into Chapter 3.
2 5 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 290dd-3, 29033-3 (1988) and 42 C.F.R. § 2.12(3)(4) (1990).
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Another consideration is the limited scope of the UHCIA. "The provisions of [the
UHCIA] are limited ... to providers and hospitals in a relationship with the patient. It
does not address secondary uses of health care information." [OTA93:77]
Massachusetts State Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act
The Massachusetts State Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act is
"based in large part on model rules proposed by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC)." [OTA93:76] The Insurance Act stipulates provisions for the
acceptable use and disclosure of individually identifiable policy holder information
related to claims and coverage.
"While this law was drafted specifically to address the problems of life, health and
disability insurance information, many of the definitions, principles and provisions are
equally applicable to providing privacy protection for health care information generally."
[OTA93:76] Relevant portions of the Insurance Act offer a model for how to affect both
disclosure and use.
As with acts devoted explicitly to health related information, the Insurance Act
narrowly defines criteria for permitting the disclosure of individually identifiable
information both with and without the subject's consent. No differentiation between
electronic and paper records is made.
Of the policies surveyed, unique to the Insurance Act was the explicit
identification of specific "uses" for insurance related information. Depending upon the
"use", different disclosure guidelines are mandated. For example, recorded personal
information and medical records are differentiated from investigative consumer reports
which are, in turn, differentiated from personal or privileged information from insurance
transactions. [MASS:§7, 8, 13]
Whether a cause or an effect, a related implication of categorizing permissions
based upon use is the creation of different confidentiality classes of individually
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identifiable information. In particular, AIDS and ARC26 are singled out as being
particularly sensitive and deserving of extra care. Gender, race and sexual preferences
also qualify. Activities to aggregate or infer information about such personal
characteristics are explicitly prohibited. [MASS:§2, 7(d)]
Fair Health Information Practices Act of 1994 (H.R. 4077)
Representative Condit introduced the Fair Health Information Practices Act of
1994 to the House of Representatives on March 17, 1994. The Act answers the perceived
need for Federal action in response to "[t]he movement of individuals and health
information across State lines, access to and exchange of health information from
automated data banks and networks and the emergence of multistate health care providers
and payers." [HR4077b:§2(a)(4)]
Unlike existing computer security and privacy legislation that applies only to
Federal computer systems, H.R. 4077 relies upon the interstate commerce clause of the
Constitution to promulgate a single, uniform set of rules and procedures governing the
use and disclosure of identifiable patient health data in any institution.
[HR4077b:§2(a)(4), 3(b)(3)(A)]
Similar to the AHIMA model language, the uniform protection offered by H.R.
4077 applies to the data itself rather than to the recordkeeper. Consequently, "[i]n
general, protected health information remains subject to statutory restriction no matter
how it is used or disclosed." [HR4077a] Whether the recipient of sensitive medical
information is a provider, payer, researcher, or marketer, the same regulations apply.
Unique to H.R. 4077 among those policies surveyed is the separation of users into
classes in a manner similar to the Massachusetts insurance legislation division of "uses".
"Each class of trustee has a [sub]set of responsibilities and authorities that have been
26 AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) and ARC (AIDS-related complex).
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carefully defined to balance legitimate societal needs for data against each patient's right
to privacy and the need for confidentiality in the health treatment process." [HR4077a]
Health Security Act of 1994 (HR 3600)
First introduced in late 1993, the Health Security Act attempts to address the
multi-headed health hydra which includes exploding costs, inconsistent quality and
inadequate coverage. The Health Security Act "establishes twin goals of electronic
records and electronic data interchange" as part of the solution. [BRO93:40]
On the subject of health information security, however, the Act is vague. As with
existing privacy legislation, the Act centers safeguards around a code of fair information
practices that stipulates that "subjects of the health data collected, have the right to ...
approve the uses to which the data are put; ... and have adequate assurance that data may
be collected and used only for legitimate purposes." [BRO93:43] However, there is no
notion of what constitutes a "legitimate purpose."
Protection Lapplies to all individually-identifiable health care information:
* Whether it is part of the new health care system or exists outside it.
* With the same level of protection [for information about any] illnesses
and disease [i.e., universal protection].
* Regardless of the form in which records are kept (paper, microfilm, or
electronic), location (storage, transit, archive), owner, user or
repository (government, health provider, private organization).
[HR3600: 136]
However, how complete or extensive the universal protection will be is unclear. One
objection to preemptive legislation that provides the same level of protection to all
manners of health care data is that information security will be set to the lowest common
denominator rather than being held to a higher standard. [OTA93] Moreover, even
existing legislation acknowledges that some types of information (e.g., drug and alcohol
abuse related information) is more sensitive than others. [WED92; WED93b]
Finally, the Act would "explicitly forbid the linking of healthcare [sic] and other
information through the identification number." [BRO93:44] However, even the
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Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 acknowledges a legitimate need
for and use of matching in particular circumstances.
3.2 Policy analysis
Drawing on this analysis of the status quo and proposed policies, it is clear that a
policy to ameliorate disclosure and inference related risks must address several issues.
The decisive elements of a policy can be considered as a series of questions:
* Control access versus control use?
* Categorize information?
* Categorize users?
* Address electronic information exclusively or explicitly?
* Address patient information only?
* Promulgate Federal, state, or institutional policy?
Control access versus control use?
Of those surveyed, security poli ies tend to fall along a continuum between two
general strategies: those that control access and those that control use. Policies of the
former focus on who the prospective users are. Such policies are typified by trust. If an
individual is authorized to look at a certain piece of data, the user is trusted to know and
observe the privileges and policies associated with receiving that information. 2 7 Policies
of the latter type rely upon limiting what a user may do either with or based upon the
information that they have seen. For example, in the legal system, as a part of attempts to
preserve impartiality, jurors can be recused if they have read or heard too much about the
case being tried.
Disclosure and inference can be addressed by either policy. In the extreme case,
using an access based policy, the source only relinquishes data if it does not care what the
receiver will do with that information. Likewise, a sender makes data universally
available under the general policy that no one can use any information that they receive.
2 7 A subsequent chapter will elaborate upon the military, hierarchical access control scheme where users have
clearances and information has sensitivity labels. Together, clearances and sensitivities determine to what information
a specific user is authorized to have access.
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Practically speaking, however, even if either extreme were enforceable, data released
under such strict conditions would most likely be of little or no use to anyone; the
information would either be too vague or serve no purpose because any practical use was
prohibited.
Real policies occupy the middle ground. The challenge is to define some
combination of access and use based control. In practice, status quo, paper-based medical
records tend to rely formally upon access restrictions and informally upon use constraints:
Access to a health record itself may be difficult to achieve - it requires
physical presence at the site where the records are stored - but when
authorized access to a health record is provided, it frequently provides
access to all information contained in that physical record.
[WPR93:D3]
Ethical codes of conduct ensure that data, once received, are only applied to and disclosed
for legitimate purposes.2 8
As noted in Chapter 2, the migration to electronic records challenges the
effectiveness of existing practices for controlling disclosure and inference related threats.
For example, access is no longer constrained by the need for a physical presence. The
efficiency gains from sharing records electronically also increase the likelihood that
information unobtainable from one source may either be found or inferred by querying
one or more other sources. Moreover, increasing the range of users with access to
identifiable patient data increases the risks of abuse as well. Secondary users are less
likely to have codes of conduct regulating information use. [GAB94]
Fortunately, "[c]omputerization poses problems for the protection of privacy and
confidentiality, but it also offers new opportunities for protection." [IOM94:4-20] New
policies should continue to mix access and use while recognizing that access to "defined
parts of records can be granted, controlled, or adapted on a need-to-know (or function-
related) basis; this means that users can be authorized to obtain and use only information
2 8 See LEW93 which includes relevant portions of the American Medical Association 1992 Code of Medical Ethics.
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for which their use is justifiable." [IOM94:4-20] Making use of this finer control,
however, will require some categorization of both information and users.
Categorize information
The principle behind categorizing information is fairly straightforward. Whether
for research, mitigating an insurance claim, administrative quality assurance, responding
to a legal action, etc. the specific use in question may neither need nor justify access to all
of the data contained in the medical record. Therefore, information should be separable
so as to disclose only that which is relevant for the specified purpose.
Data contained in the medical record may be categorized across at least two
dimensions: sensitivity and record characteristics. Sensitivity corresponds to the notion
that some data is more valuable than others. The hierarchical military access control
policy discussed in Chapter 4 classifies data based upon the threat posed to national
security by the loss or unauthorized disclosure of said data. Record characteristics are the
set of parameters that may be used to uniquely identify entries in the medical record.
Parameters may vary across a spectrum from a chronological index based upon the date
an item was entered in the record to a problem-oriented index based upon the DRG or
ICD-9 classification. 2 9
Record disclosure is already governed by sensitivity to some extent. "Certain
types of information, such as AIDS, drug and alcohol treatment records, are considered
more sensitive and thus receive heightened legal protection." [BRO93:42] Likewise,
even traditional paper records are categorized to some degree. Tab inserts in the record
partition progress notes from lab tests from billing information, etc.
Separating data based upon sensitivity can be problematic, however:
[T]he sensitivity of data depends on the kinds of harm to which
individuals are or believe themselves to be vulnerable if the information
were known to others. Such assessments differ dramatically from one
2 9 DRG (diagnosis related group) and ICD-9 (International Classification of Diseases, 9th edition) are standard
identifiers for medical treatments and diseases in the medical literature.
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person to another, one circumstance to another, one place to another, and
over time as cultural attitudes change.
[IOM94:S 14]
Moreover, "flagging information as having been blocked [for sensitivity] might in some
circumstances defeat or even exacerbate the challenge to privacy; such a label or flag
would alert anyone reviewing the material that it includes sensitive data." [IOM94:4-47]
Record characteristics raise equally complex questions. In particular, what data
type does a characteristic uniquely identify? Depending upon its precision, an identifier
may isolate individual sentences within a free-form progress note or do no more than
single out a particular patient's record. A researcher may want all data entries related to a
particular drug. Administrators may need a list of all of the procedures corresponding to
a particular visit or to the treatment of a particular complication. Insurers may want all
information related to a particular claim including histories of related conditions.
Specific identifiers that precisely isolate data like individual laboratory test entries
are less problematic because users authorized to see large portions of the record may,
through complex or repeated queries, eventually retrieve all of the information being
sought. Systems that use broad separators like tabs in a paper chart present more
complications. Even when carefully chosen, using general dividers to provide selective
access is difficult. The autonomy sought in federated systems suggests that constituents
should have discretion in selecting the specificity of characteristics that they use.
Conversely, in a federation, information is often as vulnerable as the federation's weakest
constituent. Therefore, one would not wish to grant federation participants too much
latitude.
Categorize users
The analog to separating information is separating users. In addition to varying
"from one person to another, one circumstance to another, one place to another, and over
time as cultural attitudes change," an individuals' perception of sensitivity is also a
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function of who holds the data. [IOM94:S 14] Information that a patient might reveal to a
personal physician might never be revealed to even a spouse or a sibling let alone an
insurance claims evaluator or a researcher. Consequently, to accompany the separation of
data, users are categorized and, depending upon the category, are authorized to access
different portions of the patient record.
Depending upon the system, the categorization of users varies from a very coarse
to a very fine granularity. At one end of the spectrum, every user is a member of the
same category. Consequently, every user has the same rights. At the other extreme, each
user could define his or her own category. Then, authorizations and rights are tailored to
each specific user. As with access versus use based controls, neither extreme is very
practical. If there is only one category, users will likely have either too much or too little
discretion. At the same time, the administrative overhead of managing authorizations
tailored to each user is too great.
The default for paper records appears to be a single category where, most often,
users either get the entire record or else they get nothing. Claims evaluators, lawyers,
consulting physicians, etc. often get the entire record even though only specific portions
are requested or required. [WPR93; IOM94] Separating and sorting the paper record is
simply too time-consuming. [GAB94; SZ094] Those that receive partial information
such as some claims evaluators or public health officials recording births and deaths often
do not see the entire record simply because they provide separate forms rather than
requesting the record.
Although automation facilitates finer degrees of control, a trade-off exists
between degree of control and ease of use. "In the more traditional healthcare [sic]
provider relationship with employed physicians, nurses, technicians and other
professional personnel, written confidentiality agreements generally have not been used
to protect against unpermitted disclosures." [BR093:46] Although information
technologies make it possible to enforce access restrictions that differentiate between
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physicians, nurses, etc., doing so might do more to adversely affect the quality of care by
interfering with the daily workflow.3 0 [SZ094] Therefore, when drafting security
policies, writers must strike a careful balance between providing too much access and
being too restrictive to the point of incapacitating health care workers.
Address electronic information exclusively or explicitly
While Chapter 2 pointed out that information technologies may exacerbate many
of the threats to individually identifiable patient data, disclosure and inference have
always posed some threat to the confidentiality of information. Therefore, it is unclear
whether a policy to protect the confidentiality of computerized patient records should
address specific technologies. The decision may depend, at least in part, on whether there
is a significant difference between information which is collected, maintained, or
distributed electronically versus information in any other medium.
The general consensus appears to be that "[t]he legal obligation of confidentiality
does not vary with the medium in which data are maintained. The same confidentiality
obligations apply to paper records and computerized records." [BR093:42] Moreover,
for health records in particular:
One of the most fundamental aspects of the relationship between a patient
and health care provider is the provider's obligation to maintain health
information in a confidential manner. That obligation, which is defined by
statute, common law, and professional ethics, is static. It does not change
with the medium of health information transmission or storage, whether
paper or electronic.
[WED92:4-3]
However, the proliferation of specific, computer related crimes and the integration
of information technologies into all aspects of the government has prompted the passage
of numerous pieces of technology specific legislation. The Computer Matching and
Privacy Protection Act of 1988, the Computer Security Act of 1987 and the Counterfeit
Access Device and Computer Fraud Act of 1984 are three such examples. Clearly, while
30 This issue is discussed further in Chapter 4.
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confidentiality obligations may remain the same, "the electronic medium will potentially
allow for remote and unauthorized review of unlimited health information. It will greatly
increase the dimension of inadvertent and intentional breaches of confidentiality."
[WED92:4-4]
Address patient information only
Several of the policies surveyed differed in scope, ranging from an exclusive
focus on individually identifiable information in the patient-provider relationship to
addressing all types of individually identifiable information, not just health care related
records. As with policies that single out electronic media, whether policies to support the
confidentiality of computerized patient records tend towards the former or towards the
latter may depend, at least in part, on whether patient information is significantly
different about any other individually identifiable information.31
General policies such as the Computer Privacy Act of 1974 or the Computer
Security Act of 1987 make no specific mention of health care related information as
having any greater need for protection or being at any greater risk than any other
individually identifiable information. "[A]ny data element in medical records, and many
data items from other records, could be considered either health-related or sensitive, or
both. Where the boundaries for the protection of personal health information lie is not at
all obvious." [IOM94:4-14] Furthermore, to the degree that sensitivity is dependent "on
the kinds of harm to which individuals are or believe themselves to be vulnerable if the
information were known to others," health care related information is not unique with
respect to privacy. [IOM94:S 14]
However, there seems little doubt that "information about the functions of a
person's own body, in illness or health, is some of the most intimate information
possessed by an individual." [WPR93:D 1 ]
3 1Other individually identifiable information might include financial records, judicial proceedings, and academic
records.
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Perhaps a more concrete distinction between any two types of information (not
necessarily health related) relates to the categorization of information and users discussed
earlier. Dividing information and separating users to simplify the administration and
increase the effectiveness of security controls requires some boundary on the body of
information a particular policy addresses. Otherwise, there is no effective context from
which to divide users.
Promulgate Federal, state, or institutional policy
The policies surveyed traverse a broad spectrum of existing and proposed policies
at the Federal, state and institutional levels. While it is possible that issues such as
regulating access versus use or categorizing users should be addressed exclusively by
only one of these levels, it seems far more likely that a comprehensive security policy
will include actions at multiple levels.
In the status quo, responsibility for the confidentiality of health information is
centered on the health care provider and regulated primarily by the states. [IOM94;
WED92] Unfortunately, state regulations have many limitations. Within a state, "[t]he
great variance in disclosure rules creates inconsistent standards for providers and offers
inconsistent protection to patients." [WED92:4-17] "A brief review of state statutes
indicated that in one state, more than 50 different statutes and regulations pertain to the
confidentiality of medical information." [IOM94:4-33] The interstate nature of modern
health delivery also defeats state action:
Records will be routinely transmitted electronically across state lines, and
may even be created simultaneously in two different states; ... although
they are generally similar in their intent, [confidentiality laws] differ from
state to state both in scope and application.
[WPR93:D7]
As noted earlier, to date, efforts by the states to adopt uniform legislation have failed.32
Finally, even if protection is applied consistently across the different states, more often
3 20nly Montana and Washington have adopted the Uniform Health Care Information Act.
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than not, "such protection is no longer in effect once the data have left the recordkeeper's
control." [IOM94:S 13] Consequently, there is no control of redistribution.
As an alternative to the status quo, several of the proposed policies suggest that
"Federal preemptive legislation is required to establish uniform requirements for the
preservation of confidentiality and protection of privacy rights for health data about
individuals." [IOM94:S 13] Federal legislation could also "clearly establish that the
confidentiality of person-identifiable data is a property afforded to the data elements
themselves, regardless of who holds those data." [IOM94:S 13]
Clearly, some level of Federal action is warranted. As suggested earlier, many of
the issues raised in the policy survey might be better met at the national level. However,
apart from political issues such as federalism33 , there remains the question of which
issues require a national mandate and which should be reserved for individual states and
institutions. Before speculating further, this thesis turns to the technology. What
information technologies can do to support security policies may affect the nature of the
policies that emerge.
3 3 Federalism in the sense of separation of powers between the states and the national government.
Chapter Four
Access Controls
Having identified a set of security objectives and considered elements of a
security policy required to meet the objectives, this chapter turns to mechanisms that
implement the objectives and the policy. Specifically, this chapter analyzes logical and
procedural elements of access control polices. Traditional discretionary and mandatory
access control policies (DAC and MAC) may be insufficient for addressing many of the
concerns raised in Chapter 2. Role-based access controls are introduced, and a
description is given of how role-based access controls might be applied to the
computerized patient record (CPR) environment. The chapter concludes by noting the
limitations of role-based access controls and argues for a balance between technology-
based and policy-based solutions to address the issue of information security.
As noted earlier, although they play a crucial role in providing a complete picture
of security for the CPR, issues related to communications and maintaining consistency
between the different constituents in the federation are not addressed. The remainder of
the discussion also assumes that users have been properly identified, authenticated and
that activities are audited. Identification and authentication refers to the log-on procedure
of identifying who the user is and verifying that the user has permission to access the
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system.3 4 Auditing is the process of recording security relevant activities in a log of
system events.3 5
4.1 What is DAC
Traditional DAC (discretionary access control) is defined in terms of subjects,
objects, access modes and predicates. Subjects constitute the finite set S of users, groups
of users, or processes that may execute on behalf of a particular user. Objects are the set
O of elements to which users are granted access. For the CPR, each portion of the record
(e.g. progress notes, lab results, demographic data, etc.) might be represented by a
separate object, the union of which would constitute a complete patient record. The
different ways in which a user may access an object, whether the user may read or write a
specific portion of the patient record, form the set M of access modes. Finally, some
access modes may be conditional. A physician might only be permitted to look at the
records of patients under her direct care. P is the set of predicates that defines such
conditions as logical statements.
An access rule is therefore a tuple consisting of < s, o, m, p> where s E S,
o E 0, m E M, p E P. The rule explicitly declares that subject s may access object s2 in
the modality m subject to the constraint p. Once a user has logged onto a system and
been identified and authorized, requests to manipulate information in the system would
be tested against specific access rules. One rule might permit Dr. Smith to read and write
progress notes for patients under his care. A different rule might restrict insurance agent
3 4Mechanisms for identifying and authenticating users typically involve some combination of three parameters: what
the user knows, what the user owns, and who the user is. Passwords are included in the category of what the user
knows. Cards or tokens presented to a security guard as identification for entry to a secure area are an example of
something the user might own. Biometric devices that match fingerprints or retinal scans can identify users based upon
physical characteristics who they are. Further references to identification and authentication may be found in [NRC91;
OTA87; OTA93]
35The granularity of what activities are logged (e.g., record every keystroke or merely maintain which users logged on
to or off of the system at what times) and to what purpose the log is applied have raised many questions concerning a
user's privacy rights. Audit trails also tend to accumulate rapidly into large, unmanageable records. Please see
[NRC91; OTA93] for further information on audit trails.
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Smith to read-only access of a specific lab result in order to verify that a test for which
reimbursement was being claimed was actually administered. [GRA93; NYA93; PER93]
Traditional DAC is commonly depicted as a matrix that separates subjects into
rows and objects into columns. The cells that form the intersections of the matrix contain
entries representing the modalities and authorizations that constrain the relevant subject's
access to each respective object. [PER93]
A defining characteristic of DAC is that a user (or a program operating on a user's
behalf) is permitted to specify the access modalities and constraints with which others
may access objects owned or created by that user. [DOD85; NOT91] Stated differently,
DAC permits a subject s to pass an access right on an object <o, m, p> accorded to s,,
to another subject s2 . The system trusts s, 's discretion.
4.2 What is MAC
MAC (mandatory access control) involves a hierarchical assignment of clearances
to subjects and classifications to objects. Although clearance levels reflect the privilege
of users while classification levels reflect the relative sensitivity of information, both
clearances and classifications use the same metric (e.g., secret, top secret, etc.).
Traditional MAC assumes that users may perform one of two operations on data:
users may read from or write to a data file (writing assumes the ability to read as well).
As a policy, MAC is defined by two rules: simple security and the *-property (read as
the star property). Simple security mandates that a subject may read an object if and
only if the subject's clearance level is greater than or equal to the object's classification
level. [DOD85] The *-property, also called the confinement property, governs write
access. [DOD85] It states that a subject may only write to an object if the object's
classification level is greater than or equal to the subject's clearance level.
Enforcement of MAC involves the process of comparing a user's clearance to the
classification of the object for which access is being requested. [DOD85] The
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combination of restrictions on read and write guards against the unauthorized disclosure
of information by ensuring that users cannot gain access to information for which they are
not cleared. 'Simple security' prevents a user from reading information marked with a
higher classification and the '*-property' prevents a user from writing information at one
classification level into a document with a lower classification, thereby making the
document available to unauthorized users who would ordinarily be prevented by the
'simple security property'.
A hierarchical ordering of classifications and clearances might suggest that any
user with a higher clearance could access all of the objects accessible to a user with a
lower clearance. However, MAC recognizes that some classifications and some
clearances may be equivalent. Resident A and Resident B may both have access to
patient files, but each reads a different subset of patient files because different patients
see different physicians. In recognition that equivalencies may exist, traditional MAC is
satisfiable given a partial ordering on clearances and classifications. [NCS92]
As a policy, MAC is mandatory in that the 'simple security' and the '*-property'
are always enforced on every subject and every object whereas DAC rules are tailored by
and applied at the discretion of individual subjects. DAC rules are also mandatory to the
degree that they are always enforced as specified. The distinction between MAC and
DAC lies in a subject's ability to grant access rights. MAC does not provide subjects
with the ability to grant rights.
DAC and MAC are not mutually exclusive, however. The simultaneous
implementation of DAC and MAC uses the MAC rules to constrain the degree of
discretion a subject may specify. For example, subject s, cannot grant read access on an
object o to a different subject s2 if the classification of o dominates the clearance of s2.
Doing so would violate the 'simple security policy.' Likewise, though a subject's
clearance dominates an object's classification, access is not automatically granted.
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Rather, subjects cleared under the MAC rules must still be granted access rights by the
object's owner. This embodies the military concept of need to know. [NRC91; NCS92]
4.3 Limitations of traditional access control policies
Although DAC and MAC (discretionary and mandatory access control) are both
well understood, from the perspective of the CPR, neither is particularly well suited to a
federated environment in general nor to the medical environment in particular.
Many difficulties that DAC has with the federated environment are related to the
large number of potential users in an environment that attempts to interconnect large
numbers of users from heterogeneous systems:
As the number of users increases, so too does the complexity of managing the
different access constraints relating each subject and object. [PER93]
While access constraints may be expressed as a tuple <s, o, m, p>, because
federations attempt to preserve the autonomy of constituents, differences may
exist between the granularity upon which objects are defined, access modes and
the syntax with which predicates defining conditions governing access are
expressed. 3 6
By interconnecting related systems, federations increase the risk of unauthorized
logical inference. Subjects may either aggregate large amounts of data from a
single source or query bits of information from many different sources to infer
information that would otherwise be inaccessible. [MOR92]
Systems that permit the discretionary granting of privileges are particularly
vulnerable to Trojan Horse attacks where malicious code executes with all of a
subject's privileges but without that subject's knowledge or consent. [GRA93;
McC90; NOT91]
DAC's support of a subject's discretion in granting privileges complicates the ability to
enforce a consistent security policy across the entire federation. Conversely, if
implemented in its traditional sense, MAC would apply at the global level and apply
uniformly across the federation. Using technology to enforce a global policy is also
problematic, however: MAC is equally vulnerable to the heterogeneity of federation
361s an object o equivalent to the entire patient record or more finely tuned to correspond to individual entries in the
progress notes. Some systems may support the access modality m(delete) while others, like accounting software, might
prohibit deletions altogether. [CLA87] Predicates p might be expressed in first-order predicate calculus in one system
and as a table in another.
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constituents. Different systems may use different terms in their classification and/or
clearance hierarchy. Other systems may map classifications and clearances differently.
[PER93; MOR92]
Even if patient records were not implemented in a federated environment,
however, traditional access controls might not be suited to the medical context. In
traditional DAC, the creator of an object is the subject with the right to transfer access to
others. Who owns the information in a medical record and who should have the right to
transfer access to others is not immediately clear. [TIN88; NOT91] Although intuition
suggests that patients own the information and should determine disclosure, not all
disclosures can or should require consent or notification of the patient.3 7 In emergency
situations, the patient might be unable to authorize a transfer of records. As part of an on-
going criminal investigation or for public policy reporting requirements such as suspected
child-abuse, requesting consent might be inadvisable. And in some cases, such as the
public health reporting of deaths, consent might be impossible to obtain.
A second problem with DAC is that access constraints are not tightly bound to the
data. "Thus, a user who is allowed only read access to a data object would still be able to
make a copy of that object and pass it on to some other user." [NOT91:15] A user
authorized for read only could still copy the record and redistribute it to subjects who
were not originally granted access. [McC90]
The same problem exists, albeit to a lesser degree, for MAC. Without DAC
support, a user with the appropriate clearance has the authority to read and write records
provided the clearance and classification levels are consistent regardless of the "need to
know". This is somewhat akin to permitting a professor to write on any student's grade
report regardless of whether the student has taken the professor's class.
The problem of binding constraints to data is further exacerbated in a federated
environment. Once information resides in another system, there is no practical, technical
3 7please see Chapter 3.
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mechanism for ensuring that the receiving system has either the means or the inclination
to enforce the sender's constraints on disclosure and/or modes of access. For both DAC
and MAC, the alternatives are:
1. Permit each constituent of the federation to personally conduct a technical
evaluation of all participating systems to verify the security measures.
2. Refuse to disclose any information and withdraw from the federation.
3. Blindly trust participating constituents.
For each constituent to fully preserve its own autonomy would suggest alternative 1 or
alternative 2. Because neither is practical, in practice, constituents must adopt a middle
ground, sacrificing some autonomy and exercising some degree of trust in exchange for
realizing the benefits of collaboration. [McC90]
One of the greatest limitations of traditional MAC is the requirement that at least
a partial order exist on clearance and classification levels. As with many non-military
environments, a partial ordering cannot necessarily be defined for the medical domain.
[BIS90] For medical records, administrators may have permission to view non-
individually identifiable patient information for quality assurance or utilization review
purposes; but physicians have access to identifiable, diagnostic portions of the record.
Conversely, administrators view patient-identifiable billing information for
reimbursement purposes while physicians have no reason to know a patient's insurance
status. This anecdotal evidence suggests that there is no clear sense of order regarding
clearances or classifications in the medical environment. A survey conducted by Grizalis
et. al. confirms that not all user classes and information labels are hierarchical. [GRI91]
Some contexts are better represented as a table than as a graph structure. [GRI91; BIS90]
As a consequence of the limitations of DAC and MAC, researchers have focused
on developing access controls that may prove more flexible in adjusting to the
requirements of environments beyond the traditional, military domain. In particular, one
such body of work, generally referred to as role-based access control, shows promise as a
technology for supporting confidentiality requirements of CPRs. After introducing and
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defining role-based access control, this chapter will question its advantages, apply it to
the medical record environment and conclude by raising some limitations of role-based
access control.
4.4 What is role-based access control
The need for and concept of role-based access stems from two simple
observations:
The workplace is a social environment. The introduction of information
technologies such as CPRs into the medical center may disrupt the standard
workflow and patterns by which employees accomplish their routine tasks.
"Many systems, satisfactory from a technological point of view, have failed
because of a too limited consideration of social factors." [CAS92: 146]
The workplace is a dynamic environment. Both the users seeking access to
information and the data itself are in a constant state of flux. The absence of one
employee due to sickness or vacation will affect the activities, responsibilities and
information needs of others. [CAS92]
Tlese two observations suggest the need for controls that more accurately reflect the
nature of the workplace being automated. Moreover, adopting such controls could
facilitate the evolving structure of a networked health care system. Role-based access
control recognizes that a user's need for information is not inherent to the user's person.
Rather, the need for access is a function of what tasks the user is performing.
[THO91:166] For example, in Figure 4. 1, user s has no inherent need to record a
patient's vital signs. To fulfill the duties and obligations of a physician, however, s may
need to collect and make note of a patient's health status. Moreover, role-based access
control recognizes that multiple users can play a single role, and that likewise, a single
user may assume many different roles at different times.3 8
More formally, role-based access control may be defined using the constructs
originally defined for DAC: The finite set S of users, groups and processes that execute
38Whether a single user can assume multiple roles at any one time is taken up later.
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on behalf of a specific user, objects 0, access modes M and predicates P Let an access
right be defined as the tuple <o, m, p> where o E O, m E M, p E p.3 9
Definition: A role is a named collection of access rights. It consists of a name RN and a
list of tuples AL of the form <o, m, p>. [NYA93]
Figure 4.1
Many-to-many mapping between users and roles
A
Ef
Administrator
Physician
Lecturer
Subjects may only access objects through a role. The many-to-many mapping of
subjects to roles and assignment of access rights to a particular role is a system function
reserved for the role of the system administrator. Subjects themselves may not grant the
39 Note that the phrase access right, as used here, is also referred to as a capability in some of the information security
literature. Because the term capability is not necessarily used consistently, however, it is intentionally omitted to avoid
ambiguity and confusion.
s3
S4
s2
76 Chapter Four
right to assume a role to another subject. Likewise, roles may not reassign access rights
to roles except as explicitly defined as a characteristic of the role itself. For example, the
role of system administrator has the right to assign access rights to roles.
No ordering is assumed on roles. However, it is possible to order roles
hierarchically. Hierarchical ordering enables the inference of access rights. [NYA93]
Inference is a technique for simplifying the administration of complex access rights.
When two or more sub-roles RN1 ...n share a set of access rights, rather than
administering the access right for each user separately, the system administrator creates a
generalized role RNg with access rights ALg where ALg = rn (AL ...n J. Thereafter, a
user acting in role RNi, (I •i •n) who wishes to exercise a right in ALg derives the
right from the relationship between RN i and RNg . For example, in Figure 4.2, the
medical specialists share the right to write in a patient file. An anesthesiologist infers the
authorization to write in the medical record through the association between the role
"anesthesiologist" and the role "physician."
Figure 4.2
Inheritance and hierarchical ordering of roles
Physician
Write in the medical record
Internal Nuclear
Anesthesiology Medicine Medicine Orthopedics Pathology
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Subjects may assume only a single role at any one time. Roles may not be
combined to yield a greater set of rights. The distinction between inferring rights and
combining roles is often subtle. Inference is defined by the hierarchical relationship
between roles. However, such a relationship is not always present. Equivalence classes
where no one role dominates any other is one such instance. In Figure 4.2, inference
corresponds to the relationship between each respective specialty and the general role
titled "physician." Combining roles would correspond to an anesthesiologist attempting
to simultaneously attempt to perform as a pathologist or an orthopedic surgeon.
Role-based access control is really no more than an extension of traditional DAC
(discretionary access control). First, DAC is often defined simply as anything that is not
traditional MAC. [McC90] Second, it is important to recognize that roles are really just
another representation of the conventional access control construct called a group. As
with groups, roles are a way of combing users with equivalent rights, thereby simplifying
the administration of security. [NYA93] Recognizing that role-based access control is
simply a variant cf DAC, this chapter next addresses some advantages of role-based
access control.
4.5 Why use role-based access control
There are at least two reasons to consider role-based access control in the patient
record environment. First, role-based access control can, to varying degrees, mitigate
many of the weaknesses of DAC and MAC (discretionary and mandatory access control)
noted earlier:
First, role-based access control simplifies the management of security constraints.
System administrators have two levels for managing and tailoring access to user
requirements by designating what roles a user may assume and limiting what rights a
particular role may exercise. [NYA93]
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Roles also offer some relief from possible syntactic and semantic differences
between constituents in the federation. "[Roles] permit the identification and
development of security controls specific to user's data access functions required for the
applications tasks." [TIN88] Focusing on users and the roles shifts the focus away from
individual, participating systems to the overarching federation. The federation, in turn,
provides a common framework from which to formulate constraints. [MOR92]
Third, roles limit inference attacks in at least two ways. Roles are independent of
users and so can be defined and managed across the federation more easily. Because
access rights are bound to roles, a user, under the constraints of a single role, could not
derive confidential information by making independent queries to separate systems. The
use of predicates in role-based access controls are another method for limiting inference
attacks related to aggregations or sums. For example, hospital administrators may need
access to aggregate figures for internal purposes. If the number of data points is too
small, however, an administrator can isolate and infer individual figures based upon the
aggregate. [LIN92; TIN90]
Fourth, role-based access controls can prevent some classes of Trojan Horse
attacks. To the degree that users are constrained by the privileges of a particular role,
users may not assume multiple roles simultaneously, and roles may not grant access
rights except in limited circumstances (such as the role of the system administrator), role-
based access controls can be configured to limit the effects of a Trojan Horse attack much
as MAC does. [THO91 ]
Fifth, roles make it possible to conceptually divorce the creator of the stored
object from the data contained in the stored object. In DAC, by default, the creator of an
object has discretionary authority over who may have access to the object. Separating the
two more accurately reflects the social environment, however. For example, admitting
clerks initialize the medical record, but each medical record is about individual patients
and it is not clear whether patients or clerks should control the record. [OTA93]
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Sixth, no ordering on subjects or objects is implied or assumed in a role-based
access control scheme. As with the distinction between creators of information objects
and the individuals about whom data in the objects is about, the lack of an enforced order
permits role-based access control schemes to be much more flexible in how they adapt to
the social environment.
A second, and perhaps more important, reason to consider role-based access
control is its ability to adapt information security constraints to the dynamic, social
environment of a health care federation.
The importance of tailoring security constraints to the user community cannot be
overemphasized. Szolovits [SZ094] recounts the story of an experimental system
installed in a large, Massachusetts teaching hospital for prescribing medications
electronically. Because the system so interfered with the daily workflow by requiring
internists to have prescriptions counter-signed by attending physicians in certain
circumstances, the system was removed within days. Shortliffe et. al. also make the point
that because they were too dogmatic and inflexible, several extremely promising systems
are no longer in use. [SH090] Role-based access control integrates well into most
organizations because roles are a typical means for classifying employee duties. [CAS92]
4.6 Role based access control and the CPR
To apply role based access control in support of a security policy for
computerized patient records (CPRs), the respective sets of subjects, objects, access
modes and predicates must first be specified. Next, roles are defined in terms of < o, m,
p> tuples. Finally, subjects are assigned to roles. Throughout the entire process runs the
common thread that the CPR defines both a social and a dynamic environment.
Accordingly, roles should provide security without interrupting the flow of information
or the delivery of care.
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Although subjects are simply the individuals who use the information system, the
objects accessed by those subjects are not so easily isolated. Simply equating an object
o E O to a stored object such as a file does not appear to provide the granularity of
control necessary to support the uses in Chapter 2 while meeting the security objectives
related to disclosure and inference. Instead, govern access based upon content. [WIS90]
For every user and every use, there exists a different way of dividing the record.
Researchers may want all observations relevant to the administration of a particular drug.
Insurance evaluators may wish to have all of the information relevant to a specific claim
including current care and previous treatment(s) for related events. For utilization
review, all of the procedures corresponding to a particular visit or to treatment for a
specific complications might be relevant.
Access modes and the predicates that modify them determine whether and how
users may access and modify the record.40 In the broadest sense, users may read from or
write to the record. Finer degrees of control might permit some users to overwrite
existing data, limit others to write-once, or enable computer matching across records.
The users and uses of the record listed in Chapter 2 correspond to different roles
that are definable for the computerized patient record. The challenge is not necessarily to
identify all of the roles that exist but to recognize that just because information
technologies enable the enforcement of fine distinctions between different roles does not
mean that system administrators should enforce all of those distinctions. For example,
although, in principal, there is a very real difference with respect to access rights between
a primary and a consulting physician, in practice, there may be no difference at all.
[HU93; GRI91] The effects of tighter security constraints must be weighed against the
potential impacts on the social, dynamic environment of the CPR community:
First, to some degree, a trade-off exists between the number of roles and the
response time. Increasing the number of roles to which a user might belong and the
4 0 Access modes and the predicates that modify them are also critical components of integrity constraints. Access
modes can support integrity by limiting record modification to well-understood transactions. [CLA87]
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permissions that correspond to each role creates more work for the federated system
every time a user attempts to access information or perform a data operation. Efficiency
declines.41 The performance degradation could ultimately overshadow the motivation for
using information technologies to streamline the delivery of care.
Second, and perhaps more serious, is the effect on workflow. Although
information technologies can support the strict enforcement of security constraints, doing
so could significantly decrease productivity, at least in the short term. Fine distinctions
between users could preclude common practices such as "filling in for someone who is
ill" or temporarily trading-off duties. [BRY9 1].
Third, as noted earlier, confidentiality constraints in the medical environment are
further complicated by the understanding that patient care and safety are paramount. In a
medical emergency, disclosure rights are waived to ensure that care givers have access to
all of the critical, clinical information. [HAM92a; HAM92b]
4.7 Limitations of role-based access control
Despite its adaptability, role-based access control is not a complete answer to the
vulnerabilities originally introduced in Chapter 2. The technology is not without its
shortcomings:
Although it provides some relief, role-based access control is still vulnerable to
semantic differences between participants in the federation. Two federation members
may use the same role name RNn but ascribe different sets of access rights to that name.
Primary users may have different rights in Institution A than in Institution B.
Differences in how roles are defined are one factor that limits the ability of role-
based access to control inferences. A second factor is the reality that most users will
likely be authorized to assume multiple roles. Although a user may only act in a single
4 1 Faster processors and more efficient access control implementations have made response time less of a limiting
factor.
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role at any given time, there is nothing to prevent someone from making inferences off-
line, beyond the scope of the computer system.
Just as risks from unauthorized inferences are not wholly prevented, neither are
the threats from Trojan Horse attacks eliminated. Although subjects do not have
discretionary authority, some roles may have limited authority to grant rights to other
roles. The ability of role-based access to constrain Trojan Horse attacks will range along
a continuum from DAC to MAC depending upon the rigidity of role definition.
The tremendous flexibility of roles can also obfuscate rather than simplify the
management of access rights. Because a partial ordering on roles is not required, use of
practices like inferring rights to minimize administrative overhead can result in cycles
that complicate rather than clarify the security administrator's duties.
Perhaps the greatest limitation of role-based access controls, as with any access
control scheme, is its inability to extend control beyond the system boundaries. Once
information is transferred to a participating constituent in the federation, the autonomy of
each federation member and the absence of a single, monolithic security authority
prevents the sender from using technical mechanisms to enforce particular constraints
upon the recipient.
In a general sense, the limitations of role-based access control merely reinforce
the fact that technology, in and of itself, is not a complete solution. Instead, technology
must work in concert with both physical and procedural measures to satisfy the desired
security objectives.
With respect to the specific threats facing the patient record environment, the
limitations of role-based access control require procedural support to control
redistribution and inference. At the limit, role-based access control cannot enforce
constraints beyond system boundaries. As a consequence, other measures are required to
contain the potential harm from those who draw inferences from information stored
within their biological memory or redistribute physical copies of information.
Chapter Five
Recommendations
This chapter draws upon the earlier discussions about security policy and access
control to outline a strategy for reducing the risk of disclosure and inference related
threats to the confidentiality of individually identifiable patient information in a federated
environment. After reviewing the general principles of the strategy, recommended
measures at the Federal, state and institutional levels are presented.
The strategy calls for a combination of access and use controls applied uniformly
across all of the states. Despite the apparent conflict between instituting a uniform
security policy and preserving the autonomy of federation participants, the general
strategy consists of a single, consistent security policy that divides responsibilities among
the Federal and state governments and individual institutions.
Although new vulnerabilities introduced by automation are reflected in the policy
language, the general strategy divorces the security policy from specific technologies.
The premise for doing so is the recognition that the policy should remain as flexible as
possible in the face of rapidly evolving technologies.
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5.1 At the Federal level
The elements of the security policy at the Federal level satisfy the need for a
uniform policy. In particular, at the Federal level, the policy explicitly defines the
conditions for disclosure of identifiable patient information without the subject's consent
by indicating who (which users) may have access to what information (which portions of
the record) for what purpose (what may the users do with the information they collect or
receive). As noted earlier, security policy at the Federal level attempts to avoid
references to specific technologies.
Recommendation FI: Use preemptive Federal legislation to impose a uniform security
policy to protect automated records.
As described in Chapter 3, the need for preemptive Federal legislation stems from
the inadequacy of the current patchwork of state and Federal protection:
Confidentiality obligations are not uniform from state to state, and they
often vary widely and sometimes conflict within the same state. If
confidential data are transmitted across state lines, it is sometimes unclear
which state's confidentiality laws apply and which state's courts have
jurisdiction if there is a dispute. [BRO93, 42]
To satisfy the need for some degree of uniformity, the Federal government would most
likely rely upon the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States.
[HR4077] As a consequence, the security policy must limit itself to the health care
context. Although other information that routinely crosses state boundaries could also be
folded into the scope of these recommendations, such a discussion is beyond the scope of
this thesis.4 2
4 2Consumer credit histories are an example of other types of information that have qualified for uniform Federal
protection under the Interstate Commerce Clause. Preemptive Federal legislation could also be justified (although
probably not in the case of patient records) in the context of national security.
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Recommendation F2: Explicitly note that protection is afforded to the information and
not to the record holder.
A second dimension of uniformity is the need to explicitly note that
confidentiality restrictions apply to the information rather than to the record holder.
"[C]urrent state protections often apply duties of confidentiality to the recordkeeper (e.g.,
the hospital) ...." [IOM94, S13] Disclosure is not regulated beyond the provider's
control. By making confidentiality restrictions a property of the data itself, recipients of
sensitive medical information are equally bound to protect against disclosure and
inference related confidentiality violations.
Recommendation F3: Explicitly note each use for which disclosure of individually
identifiable patient information is permissible without specific patient authorization.
As reviewed in Chapter 3 and in Appendix A, there are legitimate reasons for
disclosure of individually identifiable patient information without patient authorization.
However, a policy at the Federal level that approves the disclosure of identifiable patient
information without that patient's authorization should do so in terms of use rather than
attempting to identify specific users, user roles, or portions of the record. The federal
level is too broad and general for identifying specific users or portions of the record for at
least two reasons.
First, autonomy within the federation yields semantic heterogeneities. Different
institutions may operationally define the same role with non-identical sets of access
rights. Alternatively, institutions might use different standards for assigning users to
roles. In either case, the same user, seeking the same data, for the same reason, may
receive different privileges from two different institutions.
Second, limiting disclosure and inference related threats requires content based
access controls to ensure that potentially sensitive data that is irrelevant to the purpose at
hand is not unnecessarily disclosed. However, there are innumerable ways of sub-
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dividing data in the medical record - too many to specify explicitly in legislation or
administrative guidelines.
While interpreting a particular use may also be subject to some ambiguity, when
combined with roles and a record divided in some consistent manner (as would be
required at the institutional level), use provides more nuanced control of confidentiality.
Recommendation F4: Limit the disclosure of identifiable patient information without
patient authorization to that which is required for the approved use.
Releasing unnecessary amounts of data magnifies the threat from inference and
aggregation. Consequently, if the patient's authorization has not been obtained, the
amount of information disclosed should be limited to that which is necessary for the
given purpose.
Admittedly, there is a great deal of ambiguity in determining how much
information is necessary for a given purpose. Moreover, whether a particular datum is
relevant or not may also depend upon the individual who made the notation (e.g., the
specificity and scope of a comment in the progress note).
Recommendation F5: Limit the use of identifiable information disclosed without patient
authorization to the purpose(s) for which it was collected or received and require the
prompt return, destruction, or removal of identifiers of said information.
Use is arguably the most critical of the constraints that may be placed at the
Federal level. Because of the uniquely personal nature of medical information, there is
some amount of harm inherent from any unauthorized disclosure. However, most
quantifiable harm derives from the many possible unauthorized uses to which information
may be applied.43
4 3 See OTA93, GOS93 and ALP93 for numerous anecdotes on the quantifiable harms to individuals from unauthorized
inferences or discloures of information.
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There is an important distinction between restricting use to the purpose(s) for
which information was collected or received and restricting use to legitimate purpose(s).
As elaborated upon in Appendix A, there are legitimate uses for confidential information
without patient consent. However, without consent, information should only be released
for specified purposes. Therefore to complement the disclosure condition, identifiable
information should only be kept (or remain identifiable) as long as that initial purpose
warrants. Otherwise, data could be saved and "re-used" at a later date.
Researchers or other users who might benefit from maintaining records over time
could do so after removing identifiers. The need to associate data belonging to a single
patient collected over time (e.g., a longitudinal record) could be met by attaching
anonymous identifiers. The list matching patients to anonymous identifiers would be
stored in a separate location and maintained independently of the data.
By making restrictions a property of the data rather than of the recordkeeper, it is
possible to argue that permitting the recipient to store and "re-use" data without
authorization at a later date is no longer problematic. However, doing so may not be
advisable for data consistency reasons independent of confidentiality.
Moreover, while important in principal, use restrictions are currently virtually
impossible to enforce. For example, it is difficult to mandate that a user may not
aggregate information stored within their personal, human memory over time. Therefore,
permitting recipients to unnecessarily store identifiable patient information in the
expectation that it may have some use at a later date is not acceptable.
Recommendation F6: Specify what constitutes a valid patient authorization.
This thesis addresses issues related to unauthorized disclosure and use of the
patient record. However, the definition of what constitutes a valid patient authorization
(e.g., is oral approval sufficient? must the patient sign a formal, written statement) is
crucial because doing so establishes the scope of the earlier recommendations. In
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particular, the above recommendations apply to any use or disclosure of information that
has not satisfied the explicit conditions of a valid authorization.
Recommendation F7: Avoid references to specific technologies.
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 4, technologies can support many aspects of
security policy. However, as with semantic heterogeneities, autonomy within a
federation also results in syntactic heterogeneities. The array of technologies from which
a federation member may construct an information system is extended by legacy systems
and the evolution of technologies over time. Technologies may also exacerbate or
mitigate particular threats, but the underlying objectives and the policy of limiting how
much information a particular individual receives for a specific purpose persist.
Recommendation F8: Impose joint and several civil and criminal sanctions against
violators.
A primary problem with confidentiality is that confidentiality is a zero-sum game.
Once sensitive information, is disclosed or inferred, that information is extremely
difficult to recapture. Consequently, it is better to rely upon deterrence and prevention
rather than to attempt ex post corrective measures.
The judicial system is a forum for redressing real and perceived damages.
However, a combination of civil and criminal penalties could also serve as a deterrent to
would-be violators who might consider unauthorized disclosure for personal gain. The
additional stipulation of joint and several liability extends responsibility from individuals
to the institutions that gather, maintain and distribute information. Extending penalties to
the institutions serves as an incentive to federation members which might otherwise be
unwilling to invest in ensuring the security of computerized patient records (CPRs).
Legal recourse suffers from at least two drawbacks. First, initiating legal action to
redress a real or suspected violation of confidentiality requires a violation of
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confidentiality. [WPR93; IOM94] Potentially all of a plaintiff's sensitive medical data,
even elements of the record not named in the suit, could be subpoenaed and placed in the
public record. Second, to initiate legal action, the subject must first know that a violation
has occurred. An individual may never know that a loan was denied or a promotion
withheld as a result of information contained in their health record. [WPR93; IOM94]
5.2 At the state level
The general strategy at the state level is to fill the middle ground between the need
for uniformity satisfied at the Federal level and implementation specific policies and
technologies at the institutional level.
Recommendation SI: Do not expand or contract the scope of Federal legislation.
Although the use of "preemptive" Federal legislation implies the override of state
policy, this recommendation explicitly notes that states should not have the authority to
exceed either the floor or the ceiling on confidentiality established by security policy at
the Federal level. Although this statement ventures into the realm of federalism which is
beyond the scope of this thesis, this recommendation is justified by the need for
consistent policy to facilitate confidentiality protection.
To provide consistent security, the need to prohibit the states from permitting
weaker confidentiality restrictions than those imposed at the Federal level seems
intuitive. Preventing more restrictive state action is equally important, however. Health
records (as defined in Chapter 2) of residents within a state with more restrictive
boundaries would likely be incomplete. Sharing records generated within the state would
either expose the record to the less restrictive regulations of the federation or, if the
federation attempted to honor the restrictions, result in the patchwork of regulations that
exists in the status quo today.
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5.3 At the institutional level
Institutions act as gatekeepers to individuals seeking access to data within the
computerized patient record federation. "Because the nature of any inquiry is determined
by its purpose, the kind of information involved and the requesting party, the policy of
the health care institution should be the final outcome of assessing these factors."
[BRC84, 24] Consequently, implementation specific policies and technologies are
reserved for the individual institutions participating in the federation.
Recommendation II: Identify the users of the information.
Patients who are the subject of a health record access information through a
medical institution. Insurance claims evaluators access federation data through a payer
institution. By first identifying each user and subsequently assigning a role(s) to each
user, the institution manages the flow of information across the institution.
Recommendation 12: Identify legitimate uses of the information.
A second element of the gatekeeper's responsibility is to identify legitimate uses
of the information. By limiting the uses of information, data release is confined to
legitimate purposes. 44 To the degree that use restrictions are enforceable, the potential
harm incurred from even unauthorized disclosures may be minimized.
Recommendation 13: Define the set of access rights.
Defining access rights is critical to regulating disclosure As one example,
institutions can limit disclosure by prohibiting users with read-only access from copying
data. For paper records, this restriction might correspond to photocopying. In an
electronic environment, a prohibition against copying might prevent users from reading
one file and writing to a different file.
44Unfortunately, as with any situation, even legitimate use can have unintended side effects or negative repercussions
for the subject of health information. Legal proceedings are one example.
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When modified by predicates, access rights can also reduce the risks of inference
and aggregation. For example, a predicate might require a set of at least x patient files in
order to perform data aggregations.
Finally, for disclosure purposes, access restrictions such as write-once and write-
only ensure the record's admissibility as evidence in a court of law. [HAM92a; GRA93]
Access restrictions ensure admissibility because they preclude unauthorized modification
of patient files.
Recommendation 14: Determine what objects are shared with the federation.
As discussed in Chapter 2, a fundamental part of federation participation is for
members to determine how much data they would like to share with other members of the
federation. This may be specified in two ways.
First, members can explicitly divide the record in one or more ways and define a
clear set of rules delineating what is shared. For example, the record could be divided
chronologically and any information less than three years old is shared. Alternatively, the
record could be divided based by subject such as patient directory information, laboratory
test results, progress notes, etc. A medical laboratory information system might be
limited to accessing laboratory test results and patient directory information.
However, explicitly dividing the record provides a coarse granularity of control.
Different access requests divide the record in different ways. Attempting to account for
every request and every record division a priori is hopelessly complex. A second
strategy might be to define a set of rules for negotiating what information may or may not
be shared in real-time. When one member requests information from another, a query-
response process is automatically invoked to determine the legitimacy of the request and
the scope of the subsequent disclosure. [HEM85; ALO91; McC94] Negotiation in real-
time is a subject of current research on federations.
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Recommendation 15: Confine users to exercising a single role at any one time.
Many users will interact with the federation in more than one role. For example,
many physicians also conduct medical research, review cases for medical claims
evaluators, or serve as expert witnesses in legal proceedings. Because of the danger of
misuse, users should never be permitted to access data through more than one role
simultaneously. Roles do not aggregate. Cross-over is not allowed.
Admittedly, there is a trade-off in perceived convenience versus security that
might seem overly restrictive. However, while most individuals do perform multiple
tasks at once, the hypothesis is that users tend to do so in a single context. For example,
physicians who are also researchers would not simultaneously see patients and work on a
research problem.4 5 This is a subject for further investigation.
Recommendation 16: Formalize disciplinary proceedings to respond to confidentiality
violations.
Each institution acts as a gatekeeper. Therefore, independently of civil or
criminal sanctions, each institution should take steps to ensure that confidentiality
violations across the federation do not occur through that institution. Education,
warnings and dismissal are all tools that the institution might wield.
4 5 Clinical research defines a gray area in this example. However, the contention is that even in clinical research, when
treating a patient, the patient physician relationship is defined only in the context of patient care. Data is analyzed
separately.
Conclusion
This thesis has reviewed both policies and technologies to address the security of
computerized patient records (CPRs). The concept of a federation is presented as a
model for the automated health records. The model supports multiple institutions, each
with different users and uses, which retrieve data from a composite record that consists of
information shared between each of the federation members.
Based upon this model, redisclosure, over-disclosure, inference and aggregation
are identified as specific threats to the confidentiality of the CPR that arise from sharing
data across a federation. From the threats, a set of security objectives emerges. Existing,
proposed and pending legislation and guidelines that address confidentiality of CPRs are
surveyed; traditional access control policies are reviewed.
This thesis concludes that the protection afforded by existing, proposed and
pending efforts is incomplete. Each policy merely adds another layer to the inconsistent
patchwork of regulations and tenets that already exists to support confidentiality.
Traditional access control measures are also not well suited to the characteristics of a
CPR federation. Traditional measures rely upon support that does not exist in a
federation and are either too permissive or too inflexible.
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Elements of a security policy that might better address disclosure and inference
related threats to patient record confidentiality are presented as a series of
recommendations. Separate recommendations are drafted for the Federal government,
the states and the individual institutions such as hospitals, payers and social services
agencies who wish to share the data in the CPR.
Role-based access control is introduced as a better alternative for supporting
disclosure and inference related threats to the confidentiality of the CPR. The
recommendations are intentionally phrased to facilitate role-based access controls as a
logical mechanism to support policy implementation.
There are several limitations to this analysis, however. In particular, the initial
assumption of a federated model may affect the applicability of the conclusions. There
are also many policy related and technology related issues that remain untouched and are
areas for future work.
A federation is only one possible model for the CPR. Perhaps most notable as an
alternative is the health data organization (HDO) or regional repository as proposed in
The White House Domestic Policy Council's Health Security Act legislation. [HR3600]
Although many of the issues they discussed addressed the computerization of health
records in general, the Institute of Medicine's 1994 report entitled Health Data in the
Information Age: Use, Disclosure, and Privacy was directed specifically at HDOs.
With respect to security policy, three significant issues stand out. First, the scope
of the policies considered, while broad, omits many significant players. In particular,
many professional and peer review organizations are not included. The American
Medical Association (AMA) and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (JCAHO) are two. Moreover, the final recommendations do not address
the significant role that these institutions play in the CPR federation.
The breadth of policies compared could also be widened to include the global
community. As transportation and information technologies continue to eliminate
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physical and cultural barriers between nations, healthcare information will follow
populations in flowing across borders. The role of individuals has also not been
addressed. What can be said about the behavior and responsibilities of specific users?
Aside from automation, health care policy reform has introduced many other
principles that may impact confidentiality. The proposal to introduce a uniform patient
identifier is one.
Federalism is also not discussed. The recommendations separate Federal
activities from state actives. While preemptive Federal legislation may better satisfy
confidentiality concerns, the implications for the Constitutional division between the
Federal and state governments is unclear.
With respect to technology, there are four significant limitations to the analysis.
First, several crucial dimensions of the technology are simply assumed. Communications
security and operating system support for identification, authentication and other
technologies to support networked use of computerized patient records are potentially
significant tools for enhancing the security of CPRs. Patient health cards is another.
Independent of health care reform, information security is an Administration priority with
respect to the developing information infrastructure. How application level information
security dovetails with lower level security mechanisms with respect to the overarching
information infrastructure is an area for research.
A second limitation of the technical analysis is that no benchmarks for evaluating
access controls are presented. Many qualitative reasons for adopting role-based access
controls are advanced. However, quantitative measures such as response time are not
discussed in the evaluation of role-based access control versus mandatory and
discretionary access control.
Third, existing work in the area of role-based access control or health information
security is not surveyed. Researchers have been exploring application level health
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information security issues and role-based access control in particular for a number of
years. While this body of literature is referenced, a literature review would be helpful.
Even if all of the limitations noted above were accounted for, the conclusions
would still be tempered by the fact that, in a shared environment, information security is
impossible to guarantee. This is due, at least in part, to the tradeoff between security and
convenience. Even procedural measures such as education are expensive in terms of lost
time and perceived decreases in efficiency due to security measures that alter workflow.
[NRC91] Moreover, human error will always exist as a vulnerability. [CEC93] The
tradeoff is then complete security without any of the advantages of information sharing.
While being questioned by the authorities, Dr. Kimball's classmate, colleague and
betrayer said of Dr. Kimball, "You'll never catch him. He's simply too smart for you."
Many security threats are impossible to prevent outright. There will always be those
who, like Dr. Kimball, are too smart to catch. However, a well-balanced security policy
that distributes responsibility across many levels and is supported by role-based access
controls may prevent many unwanted "fugitives" from finding out too much about you.
Appendix A
This appendix compares and contrasts existing, proposed, and pending policy
alternatives for providing information security. The analysis focuses on selected elements
of 10 policies related to disclosure and inference related threats to the confidentiality of
individually identifiable health care information. Disclosure of information within an
institution or sharing non-identifiable information between institutions is not a part of this
analysis. 'Institution' is used in this context as the user community of information systems
administered by the same central authority.
A. 1 Methodology
Analysis proceeds by way of tables. Each column of the table represents one of the
10 policies listed in Table A. 1. Each row of the table is numbered and delineates a policy
parameter. A description of the parameters follows each table. Policy parameters are
expressed as questions (e.g., Does the policy apply only to Federal agencies?). The
intersection of a row and a column is called a table cell. Table cells list section numbers of
the respective document except in the case of the AHA where no section numbers are
provided and a "Y" signifies that the characteristic holds. An empty table cell is interpreted
as a "No" to the question posed in the corresponding row.
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Table A. 1
Policies surveyed
1974 The Privacy Act of 1974
1987 The Computer Security Act of 1987
AHIMA American Hospital Association Information Management Advisory on the Disclosure of Medical
Record Information
AHA American Health Information Management Association Health Information Model Legislation
Language
WEDI Workgroup on Electronic Data Interchange Model Federal Legislation for the Confidentiality of
Health Care Information
NY Medical Society of the State of New York Ethical Tenets for Protection of Confidential Clinical
Data
MT State of Montana Uniform Health Care Information Act
MA Massachusetts State Code on Insurance Information and Privacy Protection
HR4077 The Fair Health Information Practices Act of 1994, HR4077
HR3600 The Health Security Act of 1994, HR3600
A.2 Scope
The first step of the analysis is to address the question of scope. What is the
breadth of subjects covered by each of the surveyed policies?
(1) Federal agencies only. Does the policy apply to Federal agencies only?
(2) Health information only. In this information age, an entire industry has emerged
around the collection and resale of information. There is a great deal of individually
identifiable information that may warrant protection in addition to health information
(e.g., credit data). Does the policy address health information only or other
individually identifiable information as well?
(3) Electronically stored/transmitted data only. Many of the threats to information
security have long existed and are not unique to the electronic storage media. Does
the policy apply only to electronic data or to any medium?
(4) Disclosure without the record subject's authorization. The assumption is that
individuals should have control over the use and disclosure of information about
themselves. There may be some limits to this right, however. Does the policy
make provisions for disclosure without the record's subject authorization?
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(5) Storage institution bears security responsibility. Who is responsible for the
confidentiality of the record? Traditionally, the recordkeeper or storage institution
is responsible for safeguarding the information within their sphere of influence.
(6) Responsibility extends in-kind to all recipients. In some instances, responsibility
for safeguarding information is a property of the data and not a property of the
recordkeeper. In such a case, the recipient inherits the responsibility to safeguard
as well as the right to use the information received.
(7) Responsibility in-kind to Federal recipients. In the case of Federal legislation, it
may only be possible to impose a responsibility to safeguard information on Federal
entities.
(8) Responsibility in-king limited to medical institutions. Some policies that focus
explicitly on health information may elect to focus solely on the medical institutions
that produce the health data. In such an instance, separate policies would be
required to address the confidentiality of information disclosed to non-health care
institutions.
Table A.2.
Scope
1974 1987 AHA AHIMA WEDI NY MT MA 4077 3600
(1) (a)(1,8) 2(a) a b c
(2) Y 103(a) 2A P6 504 2b 16(a)
(3) 2(b) 2A P6
(4) (b) Y 105 6D 529 Part 2
(5) (e) Y 105(b) 8 511
(6) Y 103(a) 2A 3B3 16(a)
(7) d
(8) 504
a This policy does not apply to any Federal agency.
b This is state legislation and does not apply to Federal agencies.
C This is state legislation and does not apply to Federal agencies.
d See sections (a) and (o)(1)(h). Explicit prohibitions on redisclosure suggest that, at least in the case of
computer matching, responsibility does not necessarily transfer in-kind to all recipients.
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A.3 Preemption
Given their intended scope, several of the proposed or pending policies will have a
significant impact on the distribution of authority between the Federal and state
governments.
(1) Supersedes all relevant state legislation. Is all state authority superseded with
respect to the scope of the policy as defined in Table A. 1 ?
(2) Supersedes specific state legislation. To limit encroachment upon state's rights,
some policies carefully define the boundaries of preemption.
(3) Does not interfere with state legislation. Some policies may go so far as to note
explicitly that in specified conflicts between state and Federal policy, the state
prevails.
Table A.3
Preemption
1974 1987 AHA AHIMA WEDI NY MT MA 4077 3600
(2) (a)12 e j 2C f
(3) 304
f See section 16(a). Preemption is implied but not explicitly mandated.
A.4 Disclosure without patient authorization
Disclosure for specific uses without patient authorization is summarized in this
table. Subsequent tables will elaborate on each of the users and uses listed below.
(1) State or Federal public policy interest. Are there public policy interests that warrant
disclosure to a state or Federal official without authorization?
(2) Family member, close friend. How is disclosure by or to a family member
regarded? Do family members have a compelling interest to warrant disclosure
without authorization?
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(3) Audit/accreditation purposes. May information be disclosed for audit or
accreditation activities without consent?
(4) Patient management. May administrators use identifiable patient information
without consent for patient management activities?
(5) Judicial proceedings and law enforcement.
(6) Employer evaluations. May employers use identifiable patient information in the
employer-employee relationship?
(7) Reimbursement of medical care.
(8) Provision of medical care. May information be disclosed to a provider who seeks
to provide care to the patient?
(9) Education.
(10) Research.
(11) Archival purposes.
(12) Maintenance. May employees or contractors to the recordkeeping institution access
identifiable records in the course of their normal duties?
(13) Transfer of recordkeeper. Over the course of time, record-keeping institutions may
exit the health records market requiring a new entity to assume control of the
identifiable health data.
(14) Routine use.g
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Table A.4
Disclosure without patient authorization
1974 1987 AHA AHIMA WEDI NY MT MA 4077 3600
(1) (b)(1,2) Y 105(h) 6D7 h 530(2) 13(6) 125
(2) 105(f) 6D5 529(4) 124a
(3) (b)(4)i Y 105(i) 6D8 13(4) 123a3
(4) Y 105(i) 529(2)
(5) (b)(7) Y 10 8 j 6D11 530 13(6) 127
(6) Y
(7) Y k 529(2) 13(2) 123a2
(8) Y 105(d) 6D3 529(1) 123a1
(9) 529(2)
(10) Y 105(j) 6D9 529(6) 13(9) 128
(11) (b)(6)
(12) Y 105(c) 6D2 13(2)
(13) 105(g) 6D6 529(5) 13(10)
(14) (b)(3)
g 'Routine use' is defined here to mean any use which is defined in the Federal register or is a standard relationship
(such as between a payer and a provider) that any patient would reasonably expect.
h See sections 7, 8, 10 and 16.
i Includes the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Census Bureau. See also (b)(10).
J See also 105(1, m).
k Payers [sic] are not included as an "external disclosure". This point is further elaborated upon in subsequent
tables.
A.5 Disclosure without authorization for a public policy interest
In the next several sections, the analysis examines, more closely, conditions for
disclosure without the consent of the record subject.
(1) Public health interest. Public health interests include disclosure for communicable
diseases, etc.
(2) Public policy interest. Public policy interests include reporting of births and deaths
as well as stabbings, shootings, suspected child abuse, domestic violence, etc.
(3) Public policy interest. Public policy interests also include disclosure if there is any
reasonable suspicion that failure to disclose could cause harm to any individual
including the patient.
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Table A.5
Disclosure without authorization for a public policy interest
A.6 Disclosure without authorization to a family member or close friend
(1) Disclosure by a family member. In some instances, the patient's family members
and not representatives of the recordkeeping institution will disclose information.
(2) Well-being. In many instances, disclosure to the family is a significant element of
care and is important for the patient's overall well-being.
Table A.6
Disclosure without authorization to a family member or close friend
1974 1987 AHA AHIMA WEDI NY MT MA 4077 3600
(1) 105(b) 6D1
(2) 105(f) 6D5 529(4) 124a
A.7 Disclosure without authorization for audit or accreditation
(1) Limit duration of disclosure ex ante. Authorize disclosure without patient consent
for only a fixed time period.
(2) Require information to be destroyed upon completion of use. If information must
be destroyed, the recipient cannot archive the information for later use.
(3) Require information to be stripped of identifiers upon completion. This is much
less restrictive than (2). Recipients may retain the data, perhaps for epidemiological
studies that do not require patient identification.
(4) Redistribution/publication is prohibited. No report that utilizes identifiable patient
information may be distributed or published.
I
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(5) Redistribution/publication is permitted as necessary. In particular, audit is often
used to detect fraud or abuse. Publication of identifiable data is permitted to the
extent that the audit may be carried to completion. Prosecution that arises as a result
of the audit justifies further disclosure.
Table A.7
Disclosure without authorization for audit or accreditation
1974 1987 AHA AHIMA WEDI NY MT MA 4077 3600
(1) m
(2)
(3) 105(i) 6D8a 529(7)a
(4)
(5) 105(i) 6D8b 529(7)b
m Disclosure without consent for audit purposes is permitted in section 13(4)(iii). However, conditions upon that
disclosure are not discussed.
A.8 Disclosure without authorization for patient care management
In this context, patient care management may be taken to mean:
(1) Utilization review.
(2) Performance review.
(3) Quality assurance.
Table A.8
Disclosure without authorization for patient care management
1974 1987 AHA AHIMA WEDI NY MT MA 4077 3600
(1) Y n
(2) Y 13(15)
(3) Y 13(15)
n Disclosure to medical administrators without consent is permitted in
care management practices are not identified.
section 529(2). However, specific patient
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A.9 Disclosure without authorization for law enforcement
Judicial action may require access to identifiable health records for several reasons
including:
(1) Judicial action against the patient. In most instances, medical records are
considered privileged and receive consideration. However, in particular
circumstances, as defined in the indicated sections, medical records may be used in
legal action against the patient.
(2) Judicial action against the provider. In investigations of fraud, abuse, mis-use, etc.
identifiable patient information may be necessary to form a case against the
provider.
(3) Response to warrant, subpoena, etc.
(4) Court-ordered examination of an individual. Involuntary commitment proceedings
are a specific example referred to in (1) where records may be used against the
patient.
(5) Identifi- ation of a deceased individual.
Table A.9
Disclosure without authorization for law enforcement
A.10 Disclosure without authorization for employer-employee evaluation
Because employers are increasingly being called upon to shoulder an increasing
percentage of the health care burden, the employer's access to sensitive employee health
data increases as well.
1974 1987 AHA AHIMA WEDI NY MT MA 4077 3600
(1) 105(m) 6D10a 141
(2) 108(a)7 6D10a 535(1)g 129a
(3) (b)7,11 Y 105(1) 6D1 I 530(3) 13(8) 130
(4) 105(m) 6D12 535 127a4
(5) 105(n) 6D13 127a5
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(1) As a payer or provider only. Because of the fear that employer's could use health
information to discriminate against employers (e.g., use in hiring or firing
decisions), many prefer that the employer's access be limited to reimbursement.
(2) Preventative intervention. Because employers have access to and control over an
individual's work environment, employers are in a good position to identify
potential problems and administer early intervention or preventative care.
(3) Employment decision explicitly prohibited Because of the fears raised in (1), some
policies may wish to explicitly prohibit the use of sensitive health information for
particular uses such as employment decisions.
Table A. 10
Disclosure without authorization for employer-employee evaluation
Table A.11 Disclosure without authorization for reimbursement
In particular, disclosure for reimbursement purposes concerns disclosure to public
and private insurers. Insurers, in turn, may have several uses for the data including:
(1) Evaluate claims for reimbursement purposes.
(2) Preventative information. As with employers, insurers may often be in a unique
position to provide early warning of potential complications and to prescribe
preventative intervention.
(3) Decision to insure explicitly prohibited As with employers, there is a real fear of
abuse by insurers. Consequently, some policies may wish to explicitly prohibit
certain uses.
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Table A. 11
Disclosure without authorization for reimbursement
Disclosure without authorization for providing patient care
Current care provider.
Previous care provider.
Pending care provider.
Table A. 12
Disclosure without authorization for providing patient care
Disclosure without authorization for education
Education. While the use of identifiable patient information in the education of
health care professionals is standard practice, controversy arises over the use of
sensitive information without the consent of the patient. Is education sufficiently
important to warrant disclosure without authorization?
Table A. 1 3
Disclosure without authorization for education
1974 1987 1 AA AHIA WEDI NY I 1 MA 14077 36001
(1) I 1 529(2)
A.12
(1)
(2)
(3)
A.13
(1)
108 Appendix A
A.14 Disclosure without authorization for research
Medical research includes not only laboratory medicine but also clinical trials and
the development of health care technologies. Regardless of the particular application, real
patient data is a valuable input for producing meaningful results. To ensure adequate
protection of confidentiality, however, several measures may be required.
(1) Requires approval by an independent review board. To provide oversight and to
ensure against abuse, many institutions that approve use of identifiable information
for research purposes without consent require the approval of an independent body
of scientific peers. The board must determine whether the potential benefits of the
research in question outweighs the patient privacy interest.
(2) Pre-set time limit on duration of disclosure. In some instances, use without
authorization is only approved for a fixed amount of time.
(3) R?quire information to be destroyed upon completion of use. If information must
be destroyed, the recipient cannot archive the information for later use.
(4) Require information to be stripped of identifiers upon completion. This is much
less restrictive than (3). Recipients may retain the data, perhaps for epidemiological
studies that do not require patient identification.
(5) Redistribution/publication is prohibited. Some policies might specify that, under no
circumstances, may identifiable information be recirculated.
(6) Redistribution/publication is permitted as necessary. In some circumstances, if
identifiable information is an integral part of the research and is required as part of
the scientific process of knowledge dissemination, publication may be permitted.
(7) Redistribution/publication requires sender's approval. Some institutions may
condition a research project's redisclosure as part of a publication etc. upon the
sender institution's review. In this way, the sender attempts to continue to exercise
responsibility for disclosure.
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Table A. 14
Disclosure without authorization for research
1974 1987 AHA AHIMA WEDI NY MT MA 4077 3600
(1) , 105(j)1 529(6) 128a
(2)
(3) _ 105(j)l 6D9e 128b
(4) 105(j)l1 6D9e 529(6)e 13(9)ii 128b
(5) 105(j)2
(6) 6D9f 529(6)d
(7) 13(9)iii
A.15 Disclosure with a record subject's authorization
The definition of what constitutes a valid patient authorization (e.g., is oral approval
sufficient? need the patient sign a formal, written statement) is crucial because doing so
determines what constitutes a disclosure without authorization. In particular, any use or
disclosure of information that does not satisfy specified conditions is unauthorized.
(1) Physical document/signature is necessary. Despite the movement towards
electronic records, many state jurisdictions efuse to accept as a legal authorization,
anything but a physical, signed document. [WED92; OTA93]
(2) Physical document/signature is sufficient. Recognizing the shift towards electronic
documentation, many jurisdictions continue to accept physical documents but also
recognize alternative forms of authorization.
(3) Electronic record/signature is necessary. Although electronic formats are not
required as a standard anywhere, digital signatures may become the future norm.
(4) Electronic record/signature is sufficient. Many institutions and jurisdictions now
accept electronic authorization as legal and binding.
(5) Received prior to disclosure. Must authorization be received prior to disclosure?
As discussed further in Table A. 16, may authorization be received ex post?
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(6) Authorization form must be separate and independent. Some institutions use
standard forms for authorization. In some cases, blanket authorization granting
broad disclosure authority is incorporated or hidden within other forms. [MASS]
(7) Name the individual whose data is being disclosed. Must the authorization name
the individual whose data is being disclosed? In some cases, authorization is not
obtained from the patient as in the case of a minor or a patient who is incapacitated.
(8) Identify the source of the data by name. Must the authorization explicitly identify
an institution for which the authorization is valid or does the authorization extend
in-kind to any holder of the information?
(9) Identify the source of the data in general. Rather than explicitly naming an
institution or individual, may the authorization grant authority by describing the
disclosure?
(10) Identify the recipient by name. Must the authorization explicitly name the recipient?
This may require explicitly noting the location to which the information is
disclosed.
(11) Identify the recipient in general. May the authorization simply describe the recipient
as in the case of granting disclosure to the insurance claims evaluator assigned to a
particular claim?
(12) Describe the information disclosed explicitly. Must each item of information for
which authorization is granted be identified explicitly?
(13) Describe the information disclosed in general. Recognizing that health care
information may be divided in an infinite number of ways and is often difficult to
specify, a general description of the information disclosed is often sufficient.
(14) Describe the purpose of the disclosure explicitly. Why is authorization for
disclosure being requested?
(15) Describe the purpose of the disclosure in general. If the purpose of the disclosure
is difficult to specify, is a general description of the use acceptable?
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(16) Pre-specify the duration of the disclosure. For how long is the duration valid? Is
there a fixed time limit or, if not, must the authorization explicitly state that there is
no time limit?
(17) Authorization record is kept. Must each authorization be kept for some specified
amount of time?
(18) Authorization record is a permanent part of the data. Does each authorization record
become a permanent part of the patient health file?
(19) Disclosure record is kept. In addition to the authorization for disclosure, is a record
of all disclosures kept?
(20) Disclosure record is a permanent part of the data. Does the disclosure log become a
permanent part of the patient health file?
(21) Revocation of authority. May authorization be revoked once granted?
Table A. 15
Disclosure with a record subject's authorization
o The requirements for authorization are specified for use in
1974 1987 AHA AHIMA WEDI NY MT MA 4077 3600
(1) o Y 525(1) 13(b) 122bl
(2) 104(a)6 6Clf
(3)
(4) 104(a)6 6Clf
(5)
(6) 122b2
(7) Y 104(a)l 6Cla
18/
(9) 122b3
(10) Y 104(a)3
(11) 6Clc 122b4
(12) Y
(13) 104(a)2 6Clb 122b6
(14) Y 122b5
(15) 104(a)4 6Cd 
(16) 104(a)5 6Cle
(17) 6C3 122h
(18) 6C3 122h
(19) p 114a
(20) 104(c) 114b
(21) Y 104(b) 6C2 122e
computer matching only.
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P See section 6B. Disclosure to a payer is not part of this disclosure record. WEDI defines disclosure to a payer as
within the scope of an 'institution' as defined for this appendix.
A.16 Requirements for auditing or recording disclosures
Regardless of whether or the patient has explicitly consented to the disclosure, most
policies recommend some means for documenting the disclosure of records. From the
perspective of disclosure and inference related confidentiality threats, a record of all
disclosures is a preventative measure intended to deter attempts to access or use sensitive
information for illegitimate purposes.
(1) Note the date of the disclosure. When did the disclosure occur?
(2) Name the individual whose data is being disclosed. What individual(s) are
identified in the disclosure?
(3) Identify the source of the data by name. Knowing the source may be particularly
important for maintaining consistency throughout all records on the same
individual(s). As the record moves across the federation, the original source may
become difficult to identify.
(4) Identify the source of the data in general. If the source cannot be explicitly named
for whatever reason, can the source be described in general?
(5) Identify the recipient by name. Who received the individually identifiable
record(s)?
(6) Identify the recipient in general. If the recipient is an institution or is unknown at
the time of disclosure, must the recipient be described in general (e.g. as in the case
of an insurance claims evaluator for a particular reimbursement request)?
(7) Identify the location to where the disclosure was made. Must the physical location
to where the data was sent be explicitly noted in addition to identifying the
recipient?
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(8) Describe the information disclosed explicitly. Must each item of information which
was disclosed be identified explicitly?
(9) Describe the information disclosed in general. Recognizing that health information
may be divided in an infinite number of ways and may therefore be difficult to
identify explicitly, is a general description of what was disclosed sufficient?
(10) Describe the purpose of the disclosure explicitly. Why was the information
disclosed?
(11) Describe the purpose of the disclosure if possible. If a specific purpose is not
identifiable, can the use be described in general terms?
(12) Specify the duration of the disclosure. In some instances, institutions may disclose
information for a fixed period of time or release information subject to certain
conditions. Once time has expired or the particular conditions have been satisfied,
the authority for retaining information disclosed without patient authorization
terminates.
(13) Disclosure record is kept. Must a log of all disclosures be kept for some specified
amount of time?
(14) L)isclosure record is a permanent part of the data Does the disclosure record
become a permanent part of the patient file?
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Table A. 16
Requirements for auditing or recording disclosures
1974 1987 AHA AHIMA WEDI NY MT MA 4077 3600
(1) (c)la Y 525(2) 114al
(2) Y 103(b)
(3) _
(4)
(5) (c) I b Y 103(b) 525(2) 114a2
(6) _
(7) 114a3
(8) q
(9) (c)(l)a Y 103(b) 525(2) 114a4
(10) (o)(1)b 103(b) 114al
( 11) (c)(l)a
(12) (o)(1)f
(13) (c)(2) Y r 525(2) 114b
(14) Y 103(b) 1 4b
q See section (o)(l)c. Subsections of section (o) relate to computer matching only.
r See section 6B15. Disclosure to a payer is not part of this disclosure record. WEDI defines disclosure to a payer
as within the scope of an 'institution' as defined for this appendix.
A. 17 Restrictions on inference or computer matching
While admittedly difficult to enforce, explicitly noting restrictions at least codifies
the intention. Moreover, while existing technologies are limited in their ability to anticipate
and constrain inference related activities, clearly setting forth the policy establishes
guidelines for the technology to reach towards.
(1) Requires approval by an independent review board. Does the disclosure of
information for computer matching purposes require the approval of an independent
review board?
(2) Limit use to reason for which data was collected. Is information use limited the
reason for which the data was originally collected? Note that this requirement does
not state that patient consent is necessarily required.
(3) Limit use to reason for which data was received. In many policies, confidentiality
obligations are not a characteristic of the information. Instead, responsibility is
Appendix A 115
ceded to the recordkeeper. In such instances, the policy must explicitly state the
responsibilities of the receiver.
(4) Limit use to purposes for which consent is obtained. The distinction between (2)
and (4) is that information can be archived and consent can be requested ex post. In
(2), ex post use of archived information is not provided for.
(5) Limit use to purposes for which consent is obtained ex ante. (5) is a more formal
variation of (2) and (4). The patient must authorize all uses ex ante.
(6) Limit use to purposes for which consent is obtained ex post. (6) is a more formal
variation of (2) and (4). Explicit patient consent is still required, but consent may
be obtained ex post.
(7) Explicitly prohibit inference of AIDS or ARC.S Some information such as drug and
alcohol abuse and treatment program data is already explicitly protected by Federal
law. Are there other categories of information which require explicit consideration?
Table A. 17
Restrictions on inference or computer matching
1974 1987 AHA AHIMA WEDI NY MT MA 4077 3600
(1) (o)(3) 529(2)a
(2) 106(b)5 10 529(2)a 3.11.12 121 a
(3) 10 3,11.12 121a
(4) 5B2 3,11,12
(5) (o)(3) 7,8,10
(6)
(7) 2,7(d)
s AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome); ARC (AIDS Related Complex).
A.18 Penalties for non-compliance
One of the greatest limitations of current policy is a lack of penalties to provide
incentives for protecting security.
(1) Civil remedies specified.
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(2) Civil penalties specified.
(3) Criminal penalties specified.
Table A. 18
Penalties for non-compliance
1974 1987 AHA AHIMA WEDI NY MT MA 4077 3600
(1) (g)(l) 110 11 553 18 161 t
(2) (g)(2-4) 111 12 553 18 163
(3) (i)(l) 112 13 55 1 164
t An intention to provide enforcement is stated in 16(b) but no enforcement is specified.
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